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Cyber insider threat is one of the most difficult risks to mitigate in organizations. 
However, innovative validated visualizations for cyber analysts to better decipher and 
react to detected anomalies has not been reported in literature or in industry. Attacks 
caused by malicious insiders can cause millions of dollars in losses to an organization. 
Though there have been advances in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) over the last 
three decades, traditional IDSs do not specialize in anomaly identification caused by 
insiders. There is also a profuse amount of data being presented to cyber analysts when 
deciphering big data and reacting to data breach incidents using complex information 
systems.  
 
Information visualization is pertinent to the identification and mitigation of malicious 
cyber insider threats. The main goal of this study was to develop and validate, using 
Subject Matter Experts (SME), an executive insider threat dashboard visualization 
prototype. Using the developed prototype, an experimental study was conducted, 
which aimed to assess the perceived effectiveness in enhancing the analysts’ interface 
when complex data correlations are presented to mitigate malicious insiders cyber threats.  
 
Dashboard-based visualization techniques could be used to give full visibility of network 
progress and problems in real-time, especially within complex and stressful 
environments. For instance, in an Emergency Room (ER), there are four main vital signs 
used for urgent patient triage. Cybersecurity vital signs can give cyber analysts clear focal 
points during high severity issues. Pilots must expeditiously reference the Heads Up 
Display (HUD), which presents only key indicators to make critical decisions during 
unwarranted deviations or an immediate threat.  
 
Current dashboard-based visualization techniques have yet to be fully validated within 
the field of cybersecurity. This study developed a visualization prototype based on SME 
input utilizing the Delphi method. SMEs validated the perceived effectiveness of several 
different types of the developed visualization dashboard. Quantitative analysis of SME’s 
perceived effectiveness via self-reported value and satisfaction data as well as qualitative 
analysis of feedback provided during the experiments using the prototype developed were 
performed.  
         
 iii 
This study identified critical cyber visualization variables and identified visualization 
techniques. The identifications were then used to develop QUICK.v™ a prototype to be 
used when mitigating potentially malicious cyber insider threats. The perceived 
effectiveness of QUICK.v™ was then validated. Insights from this study can aid 
organizations in enhancing cybersecurity dashboard visualizations by depicting only 
critical cybersecurity vital signs.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Background 
Big data analytics is altering cybersecurity in a potentially disruptive way by 
introducing profuse amounts of massively incomplete sets of data (Kott, Swami, & 
McDaniel, 2014). Big data is also used to detect the threat of a cyber attack or potentially 
cyberterrorism, hence, the need for data to be protected from unauthorized access, use, or 
manipulation (AlMutairi, Abdullah, AlBukhary, & Kar, 2015). Data is accelerating 
remarkably fast (Geer Jr., 2011). Data is defined as “a subset of information in electronic 
format that may be retrieved or transmitted” (NIST, 2013). “As information spaces 
expand in size and complexity, there is a growing need for visual representations that 
help us make better sense of diverse data relations and patterns” (Dork, Carpendale, & 
Williamson, 2011, p. 20). There are many challenges faced when deciphering large 
volumes and varieties of data within complex information systems (Shneiderman & 
Plaisant, 2015). A particularly complex challenge faced is dealing with malicious insider 
cyber threats (Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009). Malicious cyber insiders may aim to 
inconspicuously exfiltrate large volumes of data within an organization (Agrafiotis et al., 
2015). Thus, cyber analysts are presented profuse amounts of alerts when using data 
visualizations to address the challenge of deciphering and reacting to big data within 
complex information systems, resulting in information overload (“Big Data Meets”, 
2012). 
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Quickly analyzing overwhelming amounts of data and responding during a 
malicious insider attack not only requires analytics tools but also human judgment (Gorg, 
Kang, Liu, & Stasko, 2013). According to Gorg et al. (2013), “the analysis process 
requires human judgment to make the best possible evaluation of incomplete, 
inconsistent, and potentially deceptive information in the face of rapidly changing 
situations” (p. 30). Cyber analysts have to perceptively determine how to react during an 
attack, while they may be inadequately equipped based on the visualization being used. 
Analytics tools are most useful if the cyber analyst can focus their attention by utilizing a 
systematic and focused visualization, which aided in sharpening the analytic focus, 
essentially allowing analysts to find patterns and anomalies of interest (Shneiderman & 
Plaisant, 2015). Staheli, Mancuso, Leahy, and Kalke (2016) addressed data visualization 
challenges faced within the Department of Defense (DoD) by developing a cyber 
dashboard. They noted that within cybersecurity incorporating hundreds of data sources 
could be very difficult, requiring the need for this level of incorporation is a vital element 
for future designs. Future designs need to address the prevalent visual analytics challenge 
when examining data from multiple sources (Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). This study 
aims to develop and validate a visualization prototype that intends to enhance the 
presentation of complex data correlations. The study addressed the need for further 
analysis of end-user specifications for the development of a cybersecurity visualization 
dashboard (Inibhunu et al., 2016; Agrafiotis et al., 2015; McKenna, Staheli, & Meter, 
2015). The findings of this research add to the Information Systems (IS) and Information 
Security (InfoSec) body of knowledge by developing a novel and effective detection 
method for the identification of anomalous activities when mitigating malicious insider 
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cyber threats. 
A visualization dashboard was also developed that presents cybersecurity ‘vital 
signs’, by assessing the perceived effectiveness of enhancing the presentation of complex 
data correlations when mitigating malicious insiders cyber threats. Using SMEs, the 
cyber insider threat dashboard visualization prototype was developed and validated. The 
remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, the research problem was 
presented. Followed by the main dissertation goal, research questions, relevance, and 
significance. Then, the barriers and issues as well as the definition of terms are presented. 
Next, the literature review is presented, followed by the methodology. Next, the results, 
conclusions, implications, recommendations, and summary are presented. Lastly, the 
appendices are presented. 
 
Problem Statement 
The research problem that this study addressed was the prevalent challenge faced 
within the cybersecurity industry when detecting potentially malicious insider cyber 
threats, to enable visualization of those threats as they occur (Gorg et al., 2013; Inibhunu 
et al., 2016; Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009; Patcha & Park, 2007). The nature of insider threats 
remains unchanged within cybersecurity research, and it remains a complicated threat to 
mitigate (Kumarmandal & Chatterjee, 2015). “Employees and contractors are the second 
greatest threat to an organization, exceeded only by hackers”, as such employees and 
contractors are considered insiders (Greitzer, Moore, Cappelli, Andrews, Carroll, & Hull, 
2008, p. 61). A hacker is an unauthorized outsider who initiates a threat or attack (Sun, 
Srivastava, & Mock, 2006). An ‘insider’ has legitimate access to an organization 
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(Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009). ‘Insider threat’ refers to, individuals with legitimate access 
whose behaviors put data, intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at 
risk of being compromised (Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010; Predd, Pfleeger, 
Hunker, & Bulford, 2008). A malicious insider “is an insider who has malicious intent 
that acts against the best interests of the organization” (Santos et al., 2012, p. 331).  
Malicious insiders within cyberspace are significant challenges that organizations 
face (Azaria, Richardson, Kraus, & Subrahmanian, 2014). In 2005, a United States (U.S.) 
Justice Department survey found that 74% of all cyber-theft within organizations were 
carried out by insiders and 40% of all cyber-incidents reported by 36,000 U.S. businesses 
involved insiders (Rantala, 2008). In 2013, there were over 117,000 cyber attacks per day 
costing firms over $28 million (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2014). Current insider threat 
detection solutions inevitably trigger large volumes of false positive alerts. A false 
positive alert is a false alarm triggered when a detected vulnerability does not actually 
exist but is counted in a measurement as valid, requiring investigation of the incident and 
organizational resources (Mell, Bergeron, & Henning, 2005). According to Victor, Rao, 
and Venkaiah (2010), most intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have very high rates of 
false positives. This may lead to desensitized analysts ignoring possibly dangerous 
exploits that pose potentially detrimental financial and intellectual property damage to 
organizations (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). An intrusion may be caused by “attackers 
accessing systems from the Internet or by authorized users of systems that attempt to 
misuse the privileges given to them and/or to gain more privileges for which they are not 
authorized” (Lazarevic, Kumar, & Srivastava, 2005, p. 21). An IDS, defined as a misuse 
or anomaly detector, may be used to detect unauthorized or malicious attacks over a 
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system that primarily occurs through the Internet (Kumar & NandaMohan, 2008).  
Traditional intrusion detection and prevention systems may be insufficiently 
designed -- they may not be capable of promptly identifying malicious insiders cyber 
threats or they generate a considerable amount of false positive alerts (Agrafiotis et al., 
2015; Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). Since intrusive activity does not always correlate 
with anomalous activity, newly developed insider threat solutions that use the same 
techniques as traditional IDSs may not be adequate. Newly developed insider threat 
solutions should allow for rapid analysis of complex data correlations relevant to the 
identification of potentially malicious cyber insiders (Patcha & Park, 2007). While IDSs 
are good at detecting intrusions they do not specialize in anomaly identification 
(Gandomi & Haider, 2015). Anomaly detection can be very difficult within large 
complex data sets as it may result in spurious correlations or “uncorrelated variables 
being falsely found to be correlated due to the massive size of the dataset” (Gandomi & 
Haider, 2015, p. 143). An anomaly detection system aids with the identification of 
abnormal behaviors based on complex data correlations. In this study a complex data 
correlation refers to identifying linear or non-linear relationships between two or more 
data variables (Patcha & Park, 2007).  
Detecting malicious cyber insider threats is a complex task since their malicious 
actions take place along normal activities (Azaria et al., 2014). Identifying anomalous 
activities amidst appropriate activities pose the potential difficulty of being able to 
identify legitimate anomalies within the data presented. Shneiderman and Plaisant (2015) 
referred to this difficulty as the ‘analytic-focusing problem’. Useful visualizations should 
sharpen the analytic focus to enable detection of patterns or anomalies of interest 
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(Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). Detecting misuse by malicious cyber insiders involves 
examining an individual’s use of information and resources to decide whether the use is 
legitimate and/or deviates from what is considered ‘normal’ activities (Caputo, Maloof, 
& Stephens, 2009). Cyber analysts must find outliers or anomalies (also referred to as 
anomalous activities) within all of the users generated activities utilizing data analytics 
and information visualization (Kang, Gorg, & Stasko, 2011). Data analytics also uses 
data mining of large volumes of records, images, and activities translated to emphasize 
areas of interest that aid in understanding complex data (Kang et al., 2011).  
Researchers are combining data mining and information-visualization to allow for 
visual inspection of data examination of outlier data (Shneiderman, Plaisant, Cohen, & 
Jacobs, 2010, p. 556). Information visualization is “communicating and perceiving data, 
both abstract and scientific, through visual representations” (Roberts et al., 2014, p. 27). 
Visual analytics supports human decision-making in complex application domains 
(Arias-Hernández, Dill, Fisher, & Green, 2011). For instance, visual analytics is used in 
medicine for anomaly detection within patients’ vital signs (Dutta, Maeder, & Basilakis, 
2013). There are challenges faced with “archival, retrieval, and transformation” of the 
data when deciphering data analytics logs (Levy & Ramim, 2012, p. 99). Misspelled, 
duplicated, or data written in foreign languages may enhance the difficulty of misuse 
detection within an abundance of data (Jonas, 2006). Imbalanced data also often results in 
very high accuracy for the majority class (benign users), and very low accuracy for the 
minority class (malicious insiders). Identifying anomalies while taking corrective action 
accordingly poses a challenge (Azaria et al., 2014).  
Cyber analysts have to prioritize triggered alerts related to data moved over the 
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Internet and account for relevant cyber attacks. Security Information and Event 
Management (SIEM) tools are applications that offer the ability to gather security data 
from information system components and present that data as actionable information via 
a single interface. SIEM tools are used by many cyber analysts within large organizations 
(NIST, 2013). Development techniques for visualization systems in the context of 
cybersecurity tools should be evaluated since increased data is driving endless alerts most 
are falsely noted and increasing the response time required for decision-making (Arias-
Hernández et al., 2011). In a case study performed by ACI Payment Systems (2015), 
when the Canadian Federal Government enforced stricter anti-money laundering 
regulations. By applying enhanced profiling tables and alert rules to an existing risk 
management solution reduced debit card fraud alerts by 84% and reduced analyst 
resources by 50%. These findings indicate an enhancement of profiling tables produced 
less work for analysts while increasing detection rates. There is a lack of effective 
methods for analysts to investigate events generated from big data infrastructure 
equipment and to find the correct diagnosis of critical alert information from the 
excessive alerts (Boukri & Chaoui, 2015). 
Prior research that examined detection of malicious insider cyber threats has 
mainly been focused on anomaly detection methods, malicious behaviors, or detection 
techniques used by cyber analysts (Agrafiotis et al., 2015; Azaria et al., 2014; Legg et al., 
2015; Santos et al., 2012). Kemmerer and Vigna (2002) defined anomaly detection as, 
“models of the intended users and applications behaviors, which interpret deviations from 
normal behavior as a problem” (p. 28). According to Legg et al. (2015), cyber analysts 
can be empowered to identify anomalous activities by combining detection results with a 
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visual analytics approach for expedited real-time detection. Arias-Hernández et al. (2011) 
concluded that visual analytics challenges would require coordination of Human 
Computer Interaction (HCI) practitioners as well as visualization and computation 
researchers. Boukri and Chaoui (2015) also conferred that dashboard-based visualization 
techniques could be used to provide full visibility of network progress and problems in 
real-time. Heckman, Stech, Schmoker, and Thomas (2015) speculated that conventional 
approaches to cybersecurity are inadequate since conventional approaches that may 
include applying firewalls and IDS technologies are still being penetrated allowing 
sensitive information to be exploited. Accordingly, there is an evident need for an 
unconventional approach to address cybersecurity challenges when detecting cyber 
insider threats. This study approached the challenge of detecting cyber insider threats in 
an unconventional way by utilizing a newly developed visualization prototype to enhance 
the presentation of complex malicious insider cyber threat, both linear and non-linear, 
indicator correlations. 
In the field of medicine, practitioners understand the importance of monitoring as 
well as recording patients’ vital signs (Mok, Wang, & Liaw, 2015). In most cases just 
four vital signs serve as an essential tool for determining life saving responses (Harries, 
Zachariah, Kapur, Jahn, & Enarson, 2009). Within business organizations, Executive 
Dashboards (EDs) are used to present real-time information pertinent to the organizations 
strategy and risks because EDs are designed to enable efficient decision-making (Ballou, 
Heitger, & Donnell, 2010). Within the Department of Defense (DoD) the Under 
Secretary of Defense Comptroller’s office implemented EDs for presenting credible and 
timely data where only core data with concise tables are presented to analysts (Dees, 
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2009). Similarly, the Heads Up Display (HUD) considerably altered cockpit information 
for pilots. Using cross-monitoring principles a pilot continually references external visual 
cues, correlations of pitch, attitude, and vertical speed to make decisions in the event of 
unwarranted deviations (Dopping-Hepenstal, 1981). This is pertinent to highlighting how 
visualizations are already being used within these well-established industries. 
Practitioners are making critical decisions daily using visualizations and EDs. 
Shneiderman et al. (2010) indicated, “new visualization products should be more than 
just cool, they should offer measurable benefits for realistic tasks” (p. 539). There is an 
apparent need to identify and validate requirements and define visualization techniques 
for the development of a cyber insider threat visualization prototype (Legg et al., 2015; 
Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). As EDs, HUDs, and vital signs have enhanced their 
industries, the cyber insider threat visualization prototype developed in this study 
similarly aims to enhance the visualizations presented in the cybersecurity industry. 
 
Dissertation Goal 
The main goal of this study was to develop and validate, using Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs), a cyber insider threat dashboard visualization prototype. The prototype 
used in an experimental study that aimed to assess the perceived effectiveness of 
enhancing the presentation of complex data correlations when mitigating malicious 
insiders cyber threats. The need for this work is demonstrated by the research of 
Albanese, Pugliese, and Subrahmanian (2013), Boukri and Chaoui (2015), Dork et al. 
(2011), Greitzer and Hohimer (2011), Legg et al. (2015), Shneiderman et al. (2010), as 
well as Shneiderman and Plaisant (2015). Albanese et al. (2013) developed a graphical 
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index that would aid in providing evidence of occurrences of an activity, and identify if 
an anomaly matches a sequence of observations in a simulated environment. Dork et al. 
(2011) approached the challenge of complex data visualization by presenting a novel 
visualization technique combining implicit and explicit data relationships and still finding 
that more work is necessary to understand complex information spaces. Though the threat 
posed by malicious cyber insiders is real, there is a lack of precise analysis due to the 
sheer volume of activities (Legg et al., 2015; Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). 
Prior research that has developed dashboard visualization prototypes rarely 
addressed the perceived effectiveness using multiple SMEs within the applicable field 
(Goodall, 2007). Without a deeper understanding of the cyber analyst using the 
visualization, progress and practical application was difficult (Gorg et al., 2013). 
Assessing the perceived effectiveness of the developed cyber insider threat dashboard 
visualization prototype enhanced the validity for this research (Petter, Delone, & 
McLean, 2013). The perceived effectiveness was determined by obtaining a rating for 
satisfaction and value of the developed prototype (Hong, Tai, Hwang, Kuo, & Chen, 
2017; Levy, 2006; Ellis & Levy, 2009). Identifying and assessing the risk score was 
beyond the scope of this study. Risk calculation are addressed in the AI-InCyThR™ 
prototype (Hueca, Clarke, & Levy, 2016). Once the prototype was developed, 
cybersecurity analysts were asked to assess the perceived effectiveness based on their 
user experience. The goal of the developed prototype is to alleviate the issues faced when 
using visualizations to identify potentially malicious cyber insiders. 
There are multiple issues that reside with IDSs, for instance, triggering alarms 
where over 90% of the alerts are false positives, while identifying the true positive alerts 
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can be error prone and labor intensive (Ho, Lai, Chen, Wang, & Tai, 2012). This makes it 
difficult for cyber analysts to identify alerts that are legitimate, important, and procure the 
appropriate response (Julisch, 2003). Another issue faced is identifying anomalies within 
the environment (Patcha & Park, 2007). Visualizing the data can aid in presenting strong 
connections between individuals and entities, as was utilized to explore the Commission 
Report about the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Gorg et al., 2013). Applying 
visualizations may assist with the issues encountered with current IDSs. “Visualizations 
use enormous visual bandwidth and a remarkable human perceptual system to enable 
users to make discoveries, decisions, or propose explanations” (Shneiderman et al., 2010, 
p. 538). Legg et al. (2013) developed a conceptual model for insider threat that would 
give an all-encompassing organizational view. Applying the proper visualizations within 
cybersecurity may aid management decision-making efforts. It appears there is a need for 
a visualization prototype that presents actionable alerts to cyber analysts.  
Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) found that in a substantial number of cases, prior to 
an exploit, the malicious intent of the insider was ‘observable’. Legg et al. (2015) later 
suggested that visualizations enabled cyber analysts to identify what particular attributes 
caused the insider to be detected, and coupling the detection results with visual analytics 
enhanced detection of anomalous activities. Pfleeger et al. (2010) concluded that by using 
four basic dimensions of the insider threat (the organization, the system, the individual, 
and the environment) insider actions could be evaluated to frame responses. In Figure 1, 
these four basic dimensions are used to frame the Quality User Insider ChecKing 
visualization (QUICK.v™) interface that presented identified vital signs pertinent to the 
identification of malicious cyber insiders. Applying the concept of four essential vital 
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signs from the medical field, the primary visualization technique for each identified cyber 
vital sign was selected and applied to QUICK.v™. Based on Shneiderman (1996)’s 
visualization mantra: overview, zoom and filter, then details on demand. Figure 2 
presents a Sankey visualization that allows for zoom, filter of generated details, and may 
also allow analysts access to complete details on demand. Shneiderman et al. (2010) 
noted that new visualization products should “present information more rapidly and allow 
user-controlled exploration”, without overwhelming novice users (p. 558). This study 
builds on earlier research by Boukri and Chaoui (2015), as well as Pfleeger et al. (2010) 
by developing and testing a visual analytics prototype that aims to decrease the time it 
takes to react to potentially malicious cyber activities. 
         
 
13
 
Figure 1: Quality User Insider ChecKing visualization 
(QUICK.v™) interface Dashboard 
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Figure 2: QUICK.v™ Interface Detailed Analysis 
 
This study had five specific goals. The first research goal was to identify, using 
SMEs, the critical cyber visualization variables (see Appendix A). The cyber 
visualization variables refer to analytic variables that may aid in identifying potentially 
malicious cyber insiders (Casey, 2015). The second research goal was to identify, using 
SMEs, the rank order of the critical cyber visualization variables that the developed 
prototype should include, which may aid in identifying potentially malicious cyber 
insiders. The third research goal was to identify, using SMEs, the most valid presentation 
of complex data correlations using the identified critical visualization variables over 
multiple visualization techniques. The fourth research goal was to apply SMEs’ identified 
critical visualization variables, in rank order, and techniques to develop QUICK.v™. The 
fifth research goal was to conduct an experimental study using SMEs to assess the 
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perceived effectiveness using self-reported value and satisfaction of the QUICK.v™ 
prototype when mitigating malicious cyber insiders.  
 
Research Questions 
In the medical field, vital signs are the core component of clinical management, 
aiding healthcare professionals with identifying potential threats to the normal operations 
of the body (Harries et al., 2009). Tracking insiders within cyber and the ability to 
analyze normal insider activities or when insiders are posing a threat appears to be much 
needed (Legg et al., 2015). It is pertinent to identify changes in vital signs early as this 
may prevent patient deterioration (Mok et al., 2015). Likewise, identifying malicious 
cyber insiders early may prevent an organization from financial decline. The overarching 
research question that this study addressed is: What visualization variables and 
techniques should be used to develop a cyber insider threat dashboard visualization 
prototype that enhances the effective presentation of complex data correlations within 
cybersecurity? There is an abundance of visualization techniques available: graph-based, 
hierarchical, pixel-oriented, icon-based, geometric, etc. (Keim, 2000). Using the most 
effective visualization technique is vital for enhancing cyber insider threat analysis. The 
specific research questions that this study addressed are:  
RQ1: What are SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that should 
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider 
cyber threats?   
RQ2:  What is the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization 
variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat 
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dashboard visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber 
insider activities? 
RQ3: What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present 
complex cyber data correlations relevant to the pre-designated critical 
cyber visualization variables that are applied within the developed cyber 
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?   
RQ4: What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present 
top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially malicious 
cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber 
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?  
RQ5: What is the SMEs’ perceived effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction & 
value/importance) of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating potentially 
malicious cyber insider threats? 
Utilizing a cyber visualization prototype like QUICK.v™ may allow cyber analysts to 
detect malicious insider threats more efficiently, while allowing cyber leaders to take 
effective corrective actions. By reducing the key indicators of malicious activities to be 
displayed specifically for cyber analysts, QUICK.v™ may enable early detection and 
prevention of malicious cyber insider threats. Therefore, a real-time overall view of the 
cyber environment using appropriate visualization techniques aided in addressing visual 
analytic challenges faced by cyber analysts (Boukri & Chaoui, 2015).  
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Relevance and Significance 
Relevance 
This study presents a novel way of addressing the prevailing problem faced when 
detecting malicious cyber insiders. Past studies have aimed at addressing this challenge, 
however, the problem persists. Randazzo, Keeney, and Kowalski (2005) detailed 
numerous insider attacks from 1996 to 2002, with losses to individual firms ranging from 
$200 thousand to $600 million. According to Pfleeger et al. (2010), “insider misuse can 
threaten personal data, national security, as well as economic prosperity” (p. 169). 
Recently, this challenge has still continued to persist. Price WaterHouse Coopers (PwC) 
identified that insiders are likely to be to the primary source of cyber attacks (PwC, 
2013). In 2014, a significant percentage of U.S. executives worried that cyber threat 
would impact growth within their organizations (PwC, 2014). Approaching this problem 
from an alternate perspective with a novel development can aid in addressing this 
problem. Cole (2015) conducted a survey on 772 individuals based on the results, 34% of 
respondents estimated over $1 million was lost due to insider attacks. Therefore, 
identifying potential mitigations for malicious cyber insider threats is pertinent to 
preventing detrimental financial and intellectual property damage to organizations. By 
applying a novel approach to solving this problem, new insight into enhancing 
mitigations by utilizing appropriate visualization techniques may be applied in order to 
detect malicious cyber insiders. 
Significance 
This study assisted in the identification of malicious insiders (Agrafiotis et al., 
2015; Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009). This was done by obtaining user requirements from 
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current cyber SMEs, applying the requirements to the development of a dashboard 
visualization prototype, and iterating the design, using SMEs to determine the perceived 
effectiveness of the developed prototype. Similar to cyber analysts, nurses perform 
surveillance to identify changes in activity and protect patients from harm (Rogers, Dean, 
Hwang, & Scott, 2008). Additionally, communication delays of vital signs may result in 
patient deterioration (DeVita, 2005). Within cybersecurity mitigating adverse incidents 
require surveillance to identify anomaly metrics and attack patterns (Agrafiotis et al., 
2015). Delays in identifying a potentially malicious cyber insider may result in 
substantial losses, resulting in the deterioration of an organization (Randazzo et al., 
2005). Developing dashboard visualizations similar to those used by nurses when making 
critical decisions, but tailored toward cyber vitals incorporates a novel approach to 
anomaly detection within cybersecurity. Therefore, to develop a cyber dashboard 
prototype for the detection of malicious cyber insiders, input was obtained from cyber 
SMEs with the knowledge and experience to identify effective indicators, data points, and 
fluctuations allowing for the development of a more relevant and valid prototype. This 
study is substantially significant since there are substantial financial losses resulting from 
exploits perpetrated as a result of malicious cyber insiders. 
 
Barriers and Issues 
A barrier was collecting results from the SMEs over multiple iterations, to obtain 
the pertinent cyber variables and then to validate the developed prototype. As a result, 
participants were rewarded with a gift card for participation. Another barrier of this study 
was that after administering the Delphi technique within the second phase, an experiment 
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then needed to be conducted applying the developed prototype for SME assessment. 
Since the participants were all volunteers, they could have withdrawn from the study at 
any time skewing the final results (Ellis & Levy, 2009). By rewarding participants for 
their time this reduced the rate of withdrawal. Additionally, variations in the SMEs years 
of experience may alter the informality of their results, as some SMEs may be more 
experienced than others. As such some SMEs may be more familiar with the 
requirements necessary for the adequate detection and remediation of cyber insider 
threats than others. To ensure all SMEs had a baseline understanding of insider threats, 
prior to conducting the survey, all SMEs were informed of what insider threat means 
within the scope of this study, as well as identified variables for anomaly identification 
within cybersecurity, and significant benefits of mitigating malicious cyber insider 
threats. 
 
Limitation and Delimitation 
Limitation 
A limitation of this study was that the developed visualization prototype intended 
to visualize complex correlations based on cybersecurity related data. The cybersecurity 
data needed to be fed to the developed visualization prototype from viable data sources. 
The parsed data feeds were then utilized for generating the visualizations on the validated 
front-end. If the data input “was either incorrect, of low quality, or irrelevant, the resulted 
output was going to be ineffective regardless of the quality of the processing, 
colloquially, garbage-in/garbage-out” (Levy & Ellis, 2006, p. 185). If the data source was 
corrupted or incorrect the visualizations presented would be inaccurate. The findings of 
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this study served as the foundation of what needs to be presented within current 
cybersecurity visualizations. The prototype developed served as a tool for simplifying 
current visualization techniques and presenting the generated events. However, as the 
source of the data feeds change overtime the visualization variables used to develop the 
prototype may need additional validation. The prototype being developed would 
represent variables relevant to current applications and data sources. Therefore, future 
research may be required to apply the prototype that was developed using SMEs to future 
data sources. 
Delimitation 
 A potential delimitation of this study was that the developed prototype did not 
perform data parsing the developed prototype visualized already parsed data in a 
consumable form factor pertinent to cyber professionals. Additionally, this study was 
limited to participants who have worked or are working within cybersecurity.  
 
Definition of Terms 
The following represent terms and definitions. 
Anomaly Detection – “Models of the intended users and applications behaviors that 
interpret deviations from normal behavior as a problem” (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002, p. 
28). 
Cyber Attack – “An attack, via cyberspace, that targets an enterprise’s use of cyberspace 
for the purpose of disrupting, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computer 
environment/infrastructure; destroying the integrity of the data; or stealing controlled 
information” (NIST, 2013, p. 57).  
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Cyber Crime – “Any crime that involves computers and networks, including crimes that 
do not rely heavily on computers” (Casey, 2000, p. 8). 
Cybersecurity – “Prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if 
needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability” (Axelrod, 2006, p. 1).  
Cyberspace or ‘Cyber’ – Independent network of IT infrastructures that includes the 
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers in critical industries (The White House, 2009). 
Cyberterrorism – “Concerted, sophisticated attacks on networks” (as cited in Foltz, 
2004, p. 154).  
Data - A subset of information in an electronic format that allows it to be retrieved or 
transmitted (NIST, 2013, p. 58). 
Data Analytics – The use of data mining of large volumes of records, images, and 
activities translated to highlight areas of interest to aid in understanding complex data 
(Leventhal, 2010). 
Data Breach - An organization’s unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, or 
loss of sensitive PI, such as social security numbers; financial information, such as credit 
card numbers; date of birth; or mother’s maiden name (NIST, 2010).  
False-positive Alerts – “When something (e.g., a vulnerability) does not actually exist 
but is counted in a measurement” (Mell, Bergeron, & Henning, 2005, p. 40).  
Information System (IS) – The system that governs the information technology 
development, use, application, and influence on a business or corporation (Alvarez, 
2002). 
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Information Visualization – “Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and 
scientific, through visual representations” (Roberts et al., 2014, p. 27). 
Insider – “Individuals who have legitimate access to an organization” (Pfleeger, Predd, 
Hunker, & Bulford, 2010, p. 169). 
Insider Attack - The abuse of privileges or access by an insider that results in a breach, 
interruption or disregard of a law, rule, or policy (Goodall, 2007). 
Insider Threat – “Individuals with legitimate access whose behaviors put a firm’s data, 
intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at risk of being attacked” 
(Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010, p. 169). 
Intrusion Detection System – “Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes 
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible 
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse” (NIST, 2013, p.104).  
Intrusion Prevention System – “Systems that can detect and attempt to stop an intrusive 
activity, ideally before it reaches its target” (NIST, 2013, p. 105).  
Malicious Insider – “Is an insider who has malicious intent that acts against the best 
interests of the organization” (Santos et al., 2012, p. 331). 
Security Event – “Any observable security occurrence in a system network” (NIST, 
2012, p. 6).  
Security Incident – “A violation or imminent threat of violation of a computer security 
policy, acceptable use policy, or standard security practice” (NIST, 2012, p. 6).  
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Tool – “Application that 
provides the ability to gather security data from information system components and 
present that data as actionable information via a single interface” (NIST, 2013, p. 177).  
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Threat – “Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact 
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an 
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of 
information, and/or denial of service (NIST, 2013, p. 198). 
 
Summary 
The purpose of chapter one was to introduce this study by identifying the research 
problem, questions, barriers, issues, and limitations. In the next chapter, a comprehensive 
review of literature is presented. The research problem of the study was the prevalent 
challenge faced within the cybersecurity industry when detecting potentially malicious 
insider cyber threats, to enable visualization of those threats as they occur. Literature 
reviews to support the stated research problem and need for this study are detailed within 
the next chapter. 
Chapter one also presented the research goals and research questions. The main 
goal of this study was to develop and validate, using SMEs, a cyber insider threat 
dashboard visualization prototype. The prototype was used in an experimental study that 
aimed to assess the perceived effectiveness of enhancing the presentation of complex data 
correlations when mitigating malicious insiders cyber threats. Literature to support this 
goal was presented (Albanese, Pugliese, & Subrahmanian, 2013); Boukri & Chaoui, 
2015); Dork et al., 2011); Greitzer & Hohimer, 2011); Legg et al., 2015); Shneiderman et 
al., 2010); as well as Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). The five specific goals of this study 
were also discussed. Based on prior literature intrusion detection and prevention systems 
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may be insufficiently designed so they may not be capable of identifying malicious 
insiders cyber threats (Agrafiotis et al., 2015; Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). Identifying 
anomalous activities amidst appropriate activities pose the potential difficulty of being 
able to identify legitimate anomalies within the data presented by Shneiderman and 
Plaisant (2015). This study added to the body of knowledge by applying a novel approach 
to insider threat identification, new insight into enhancing mitigations by utilizing 
appropriate visualization techniques may be applied in order to detect malicious cyber 
insiders. 
Lastly, chapter one continued by discussing the barriers, issues and potential 
mitigations for each. The limitations and delimitations of this study were also discussed 
within the presented barriers and issues section. The chapter concluded with a list of 
definitions of terms that was used throughout this study and any applicable acronyms.  
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
Introduction  
 A literature review is presented in this chapter to provide an analysis of the 
relevant literature pertaining to insider threat detection and visualization. According to 
Webster and Watson (2002), an effective literature review is essential to creating a firm 
foundation for advancing knowledge, since it facilitates theory development and 
uncovers areas needing additional work. A literature review should also be objective and 
gather information on a particular subject from many sources, in order to support the 
newly contributed insight (Ramdhani, Ramdhani, & Amin, 2014). Thus, the presented 
literature review within this chapter displayed objective information gathering in relation 
to the need for this work. This examination consists of an extensive search performed 
within IS, InfoSec, HCI and medical literature. Quality literature reviews have structure, 
form, and is structured around major themes or concepts that emerge as the author 
examines and reviews the literature (Levy & Ellis, 2006). As a result of the literature 
review performed, constructs relevant to the visualization of insider threats for 
identifying anomalous activities of malicious cyber insiders were identified as: 
cybersecurity, cyber analysts, intrusion detection, insider threat analytic variables, 
information visualization and IS effectiveness. An extensive review of these constructs 
was preformed to determine established knowledge within these identified areas needing 
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additional investigation. The results of this literature review relevant to these constructs 
are later presented.  
 
Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity is defined as “prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, 
exploitation of, and, if needed, the restoration of electronic information and 
communications systems to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability” (Axelrod, 
2006). It is commonly used to refer to the protection of devices connected to the Internet 
(Addae, Radenkovic, Sun, & Towey, 2016). The term ‘cybersecurity’ is often used 
interchangeably with the term information systems security, though these terms greatly 
differ (Solms & Niekerk, 2013). Cybersecurity is not just the protection of cyberspace; it 
is also the protection of those who function in cyberspace and any of their assets that can 
be reached via cyberspace (Thomson & Solms, 2005).  
Cybersecurity is about the protection of the assets and people using resources in 
cyberspace and any other assets these assets may be tangible or intangible and including 
those belonging to society in general (Solms & Niekerk, 2013). Cybersecurity issues are 
different from any issues faced before (Harknett & Stever, 2011). Cybersecurity issues 
involve human intelligence and the exploits or vulnerabilities are created to defy and 
change the rules of the systems they target (Toecker, 2014). Problems within 
cybersecurity do not fit the traditional security variables, since problems within 
cybersecurity tend to also be a strategic issue and not just a compliance issue (Bissell, 
2013). There is also a profuse amount of non-geographical data and an additional layer of 
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territorial division of responsibilities that adds to the difficulties of mitigating cyber 
insider threats (Harknett & Stever, 2011).  
Cybersecurity problems became prominent following the attacks on September 
11, 2001, after which President Bush created the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(Harknett & Stever, 2011). The Bush Administration unveiled the National Strategy for 
Securing Cyberspace (NSSC) in 2003, a prominent effort to address the nation’s 
cybersecurity problems (Harknett & Stever, 2011). Cybersecurity issues persisted into 
2009 and President Obama declared cybersecurity defense as a significant national 
security interest that the U.S. government was not adequately prepared to counter 
(Sherman, 2013). To understand cybersecurity it is important to also understand 
cyberspace.  
Cyberspace consists of a growing number of connected computers, with a global 
community of individual users, and a constantly evolving set of technologies. 
Cybersecurity professionals actively work towards ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability for computers within this space (Miller & Murphy, 2009). With increased 
reliance on cyberspace, vulnerabilities have also grown (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). 
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) noted that cybersecurity issues are contingent upon 
securing cyberspace, and this issue is comparable to environmental and health issues. A 
defining characteristic of cybersecurity is that all assets may contain data that needs to be 
protected, since the vulnerabilities that exist are a result of information and 
communication technologies, all of which make up cyberspace (Solms & Niekerk, 2013).  
Caputo et al. (2009) concluded they were unable to determine a specific technique for 
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determining insider misuse, but by providing a common operational overview of 
cyberspace they have provided valuable insights for mitigating cybersecurity problems.  
Table 1 
Summary of Cybersecurity Literature 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Addae, 
Radenkovic, 
Sun, & 
Towey, 2016 
Empirical 
study via 
survey 
174 online 
participants 
Survey using a 
five-point 
Likert scale 
 
Augmented 
behavioral research 
model that 
introduces attitude 
to personal data as a 
determinant of 
cybersecurity 
behavior. 
 
Anderson & 
Agarwal, 
2010 
Empirical 
study via 
survey 
594 home 
computer 
users  
Survey and 
experiment 
using a seven-
point Likert 
scale 
 
Behavioral 
intentions to 
secure one’s own 
computer and to 
secure the Internet 
is formed by a 
combination of 
cognitive, social, 
and psychological 
components. 
Axelrod, 2006 Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 IT process and 
control 
requirements 
Enterprises must 
take on 
responsibility for 
protection within 
their perimeters. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Cybersecurity Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Bissell, 2013 Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cyberattacks, 
cyberinsurace 
The development of 
a cybersecurity 
roadmap enabled 
organizations to 
develop a much 
clearer picture of its 
current status and 
gain a better 
understanding 
of its strengths and 
gaps. 
     
Caputo et al., 
2009 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
50 employees 
at MITRE 
(Management, 
technical, and 
administrative 
staff) 
A study laptop 
running 
software 
that monitored 
their 
information-
use behavior 
There isn’t one 
behavior that 
distinguishes 
malicious users 
from benign ones. 
The most 
valuable way to 
tackle insider 
threats is to 
cast a wide net and 
strategically 
evaluate behaviors 
to identify misuse. 
 
Harknett & 
Stever, 2011 
Policy review 
and analysis 
U.S. 
government 
cybersecurity 
policy 
releases from 
2002 to 2011 
Cybersecurity 
policy 
Based on the 
national strategy for 
securing cyberspace 
the 
Goal of securing 
cyberspace was 
occasionally 
achieved in 
moderate technical, 
tactical, 
and operational 
advances. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Cybersecurity Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Miller & 
Murphy, 2009 
Theoretical  Cybersecurity 
review and 
problems 
The cybersecurity 
problem required 
new models of 
cooperation 
and collaboration 
among 
nations. 
     
Sherman, 
2013 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
58 U.S. 
government 
releases on 
cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity 
defense, 
cybersecurity 
strategy 
Senior 
policymakers must 
commit the 
resources to build 
and nurture a highly 
skilled cyber 
workforce capable 
of overcoming 
cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Solms & 
Niekerk, 2013 
Literature 
review and 
Synthesis  
 Cybersecurity 
and 
information 
security 
Cybersecurity,  
differs from 
information 
security; 
cybersecurity is not 
only the protection 
of cyberspace itself, 
but also 
the protection of 
those that function 
in cyberspace and 
any of their assets. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Cybersecurity Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Thomson & 
Solms, 2005 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Information 
security 
obedience, 
corporate 
governance, 
information 
security, 
corporate 
culture 
 
Information 
Security Obedience 
is the solution to 
ensuring proper 
information security 
behavior. 
 
Toecker, 2014 Theoretical  security 
control 
systems 
Recommendations 
to provide efficient 
risk reduction 
from cybersecurity 
events, answering 
the question 
"Where should I put 
my next dollar 
in order to get the 
biggest 
cybersecurity 
improvement?" 
 
Warkentin & 
Willison, 
2009 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Insider threat There is a need to 
understand 
and address the 
various risks to the 
security of the IS on 
which we depend. 
 
 
Cyber Analysts 
Organizations rely on skilled analysts to make critical decisions pertaining to: 
threats, vulnerabilities, and network performance (Staheli, Yu, Crouser, Damodaran, 
Nam, O’Gwynn, McKenna, & Harrison, 2014). Cyber analysts examine people within 
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organizations, internal, external incidents, within varying applications, locations, and 
dates to uncover potentially imminent threats (Gorg et al., 2013). They have the unsavory 
job of analyzing a profuse amount of alerts whose performance characteristics are often 
either unknown or uncertain (Walton, Maguire, & Chen, 2015). Analysts struggle with 
processing large volumes of data and providing valuable insights (Shneiderman & 
Plaisant, 2015). In many cases the overwhelming amount of data leaves cyber analysts 
unable to formulate effective remediation plans (Arias-Hernández et al., 2011). Caputo et 
al. (2009) found that two cyber analysts could effectively review 23 users per day using a 
developed insider threat detection system. However, they still struggled to develop a 
technique which aided in efficient identifying, with significant reduction in false 
positives, of malicious insiders.  
Visualizations benefit cyber analysts attempting to identify complex problems. 
Visualizations help cyber analysts to both identify problems, potentially malicious 
insiders, and to work visually towards finding solutions (Fink, North, Endert, & Rose, 
2009). Goodall (2007) evaluated user performance when using a traditional application 
versus one that utilizes visualizations for network packet analysis and found that users 
discovered more insights when utilizing a visualization tool. Visualizing complex issues 
using simple and intuitive methods so patterns can be quickly recognized assisted in 
overcoming cybersecurity problems (Choi, Lee, & Kim, 2009). Though Goodall (2007) 
found visualizations to be beneficial, his study focused only on network analysts and 
suggested the methods be applied using cybersecurity applications. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Cyber Analysts Literature 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Arias-
Hernández et 
al., 2011 
Theoretical  Cognitive 
science, visual 
analytics, HCI 
For analysts to 
overcome visual 
analytics challenges 
it would be best 
achieved with the 
active involvement 
of HCI researchers 
and practitioners. 
 
Caputo et al., 
2009 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
50 employees 
holding 
various 
positions at 
MITRE 
(Management, 
technical, and 
administrative 
staff) 
Study laptop 
running 
software 
that monitored 
information-
user behavior 
There isn’t one 
behavior that 
distinguishes 
malicious users 
from benign ones. 
The most valuable 
way to tackle 
insider threats is to 
cast a wide net and 
strategically 
evaluate behaviors 
to identify misuse. 
 
 
Choi, Lee, & 
Kim, 2009 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
A real-life 
Internet attack 
traffic trace 
(Network 
packets) 
Traffic flow 
generator 
The development of 
parallel coordinate 
attack visualization 
(PCAV) is a real-
time visualization 
system for detecting 
anomalies 
from Internet 
attacks. 
 
Fink, North, 
Endert, & 
Rose, 2009  
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
8 cyber 
analysts at a 
laboratory  
Visualization Designed usable 
workspaces 
for cyber analysts. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Cyber Analysts Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Goodall, 2007 Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Visualization Examination of 
VizSec literature 
attempting to solve 
the problems of 
computer security 
through enabling 
humans through 
information 
visualization. 
 
Gorg et al., 
2013 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
5 Student 
teams at 
Mercyhurst 
College for 10 
weeks 
Visual 
analytics 
Visual analytics 
succeeds only if 
developers 
fully understand the 
unique demands of 
analysis and 
the way that 
analysts approach 
their work. 
 
Shneiderman 
& Plaisant, 
2015 
 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Analytic-
focusing 
 
Identification of 10 
analytic focusing 
strategies to sharpen 
analytic processes 
and enable users to 
deal with larger 
datasets. 
 
Staheli, Yu, 
Crouser, 
Damodaran, 
Nam, 
O’Gwynn, 
McKenna, & 
Harrison, 
2014 
Empirical 
study via 
secondary 
data and 
survey 
Surveyed 130 
papers from 
the past 10 
years of 
VizSec 
proceedings 
Visualization Identified existing 
methodological 
gaps in evaluating 
visualization in 
cyber security, and 
suggested 
potential avenues 
for future research. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Cyber Analysts Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Walton, 
Maguire, & 
Chen, 2015 
 
Empirical 
study via case 
study 
 
Selection of 
visualizations 
from the 
system, 
CITD 
(Corporate 
Insider Threat 
Detection) 
Dashboard 
Dashboard 
Visualization 
 
Introduced a visual 
analytics loop for 
protective 
monitoring in 
cybersecurity 
applications, and a 
prototype tool 
demonstrating an 
example 
implementation of 
the approach. 
 
 
Intrusion and Anomaly Detection 
Intrusion detection systems are the equivalent of burglar alarms within 
cybersecurity and anomaly detection systems are a subset of IDSs that specialize in 
discovering unknown attacks (Patcha & Park, 2007). Although anomaly detection 
stemmed from IDSs, the goal of an anomaly detection system is to detect new or 
unknown attacks (Yu, 2012). Anomaly detection relies on identifying normal activities 
and reporting against deviations from identified normal activities (Cao, Li, Coleman, 
Belatreche, & McGinnity, 2015). Anomaly detection is based on event correlation 
techniques that can be categorized and utilized to infer threats through correlation 
analysis (Ten, 2010). Common types of IDSs are signature based or anomaly based (Ye, 
Emran, Chen, & Vilbert, 2002). Commonly used IDSs are often signature based and 
require constant updates of rules and known attacks to stay effective (Patcha & Park, 
2007). Signature based detection is reactive and with today’s advanced threats they are 
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seemingly outdated (Jackson, 2012). Signature based anomaly detection uses intrusion 
signatures that have to be manually added as profiles of intrusion characteristics, if an 
intrusion signature is present then and intrusion alert is triggered (Ye et al., 2002).  
Anomalies are patterns of interest that do not conform to normal behaviors 
detection techniques use identified data to develop a baseline of normal activities 
(Chouhan & Richhariya, 2015). Some anomaly detection approaches use the 
identification of a score, to indicate “the degree of irregularity of a specific event”, when 
activities result in a score that exceeds the established baseline of normal activity, then 
the occurrence was flagged as an anomaly (Garcia-Teodoro, Diaz-Verdejo, Maciá-
Fernández, & Vázquez, 2009, p. 20). Unknown attacks are detected by creating a baseline 
of ‘normal’ activities and if any activities deviate from the baseline then it is identified as 
anomalous and potentially malicious activity (Patcha & Park, 2007). Thus, activities that 
exceed the baseline as well as activities that are significantly below the baseline can 
initiate further investigations by cyber analysts. The baseline running an average for each 
pertinent variable, if the data sets activities are above average it was deemed above the 
baseline and vice versa. The baseline may be organizational-dependent and could rely 
upon factors like the number of employees, type of data being collected, number of data 
sources, etc. (Legg et al., 2015). Like organizations, individuals may be drastically 
different, however, there are established ‘normal’ baselines for each vital sign in relation 
to an individual infant or adult. For instance, the vitals of a healthy adult are depicted 
using an Electrocardiogram (EKG) view figure 3, presenting a standard set of vital signs: 
“blood pressure: 90/60 mm/Hg to 120/80 mm/Hg, respiratory rate: 12–20 breaths per 
minute, pulse rate: 60–100 beats per minute, and temperature: 36°C–37.4°C” (Mok et al., 
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2015, p. 98). Hence, comparable cybersecurity vital signs may be established. 
 
Figure 3: Standard EKG Monitor 
Table 3 
Summary of Intrusion and Anomaly Detection Literature 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Cao, Li, 
Coleman, 
Belatreche, & 
McGinnity, 
2015 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
Real market 
data of seven 
representative 
stocks: 
Google, 
Microsoft, 
Intel, Apple 
ARM, 
BARCLAYS, 
and Vodafone  
 
Detection 
algorithm, 
adaptive 
hidden Markov 
model with 
anomaly states  
(HMMAS) 
AHMMAS 
performs better in 
terms of the area 
under ROC curve 
and the F-measure, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Intrusion and Anomaly Detection Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Chouhan & 
Richhariya, 
2015 
 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Anomaly 
detection 
algorithm 
Summarized 
anomaly detection 
techniques along 
with various 
research directions.  
 
Garcia-
Teodoro, 
Diaz-Verdejo, 
Maciá-
Fernández, & 
Vázquez, 
2009 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Anomaly-
based 
network 
intrusion 
detection 
systems (A-
NIDS) 
Faster and 
more effective 
countermeasures 
are needed to cope 
with the 
ever-growing 
number of detected 
attacks. 
 
Legg et al., 
2015 
 
Empirical 
Investigation 
via experiment 
Ten scenarios  
within a 
prototype 
system 
Anomaly 
detection 
An approach for 
insider threat 
detection based on 
organizational log 
data, the 
system generates 
user and role-based 
profiles that can 
describe 
the full extent of 
activities that users 
perform within 
the organization. 
 
Mok et al., 
2015 
 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis  
A publication 
search 
between 1990 
to November 
2012 
Vital Signs Observation chart 
designs together 
with 
proper training can 
most likely improve 
the detection of 
deteriorating vital 
signs. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Intrusion and Anomaly Detection Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Chouhan & 
Richhariya, 
2015 
 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Anomaly 
detection 
algorithm 
Summarized 
anomaly detection 
techniques along 
with various 
research directions.  
 
Garcia-
Teodoro, 
Diaz-Verdejo, 
Maciá-
Fernández, & 
Vázquez, 
2009 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Anomaly-
based 
network 
intrusion 
detection 
systems (A-
NIDS) 
Faster and 
more effective 
countermeasures 
are needed to cope 
with the 
ever-growing 
number of detected 
attacks. 
 
Legg et al., 
2015 
 
Empirical 
Investigation 
via experiment 
Ten scenarios  
within a 
prototype 
system 
Anomaly 
detection 
An approach for 
insider threat 
detection based on 
organizational log 
data, the 
system generates 
user and role-based 
profiles that can 
describe 
the full extent of 
activities that users 
perform within 
the organization. 
 
Mok et al., 
2015 
 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis  
A publication 
search 
between 1990 
to November 
2012 
Vital Signs Observation chart 
designs together 
with 
proper training can 
most likely improve 
the detection of 
deteriorating vital 
signs. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Intrusion and Anomaly Detection Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Ye, Emran, 
Chen, & 
Vilbert, 2002 
 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Intrusion 
detection 
Since intrusions 
may manifest more 
through mean shifts 
than through 
counter 
relationships, we 
can suppress noises 
and variations in 
normal activities 
causing counter 
relationships to 
improve the 
accuracy of 
intrusion detection. 
 
Yu, 2012 
 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Intrusion 
detection 
The evolution of 
intrusion detection 
systems over the 
past two decades. 
 
 
Anomaly Detection Techniques 
The most important step for anomaly detection is based on the delineated data 
sources profiling the system and user activities. A series of mathematical inputs and 
outputs are utilized as predictive methods when detecting anomalies (Patan, 2015). The 
method for anomaly detection may vary based on the data source input. Data sources can 
include shell commands, system events, audit events, user keystrokes, and packages that 
traverse the network (Jyothsna, Prasad, & Prasad, 2011). Data is collected continuously 
and may be from several heterogeneous data sources (Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar, 
2009). There are various anomaly detection techniques relevant to the data source 
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identified, prior research denotes anomaly detection techniques as: statistical, cognition, 
and machine learning based, as depicted in Figure 4 (Jyothsna et al., 2011; Garcia-
Teodoro et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 4: Anomaly Detection Techniques 
 (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009; Jyothsna et al., 2011) 
 
Statistical based anomaly detection techniques capture the network traffic and develop a 
behavioral profile. Using statistical properties such as mean and variance to build a 
profile of normal activities, then statistical tests are used to determine significant 
deviations from the normal profile (Qayyum, Islam, & Jamil, 2005). Within statistical 
anomaly detection there are two steps involved: first “normal behavior” is characterized, 
then a time frame where behavior does not seem to be normal is determined (Wang & 
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Paschalidis, 2015). There are several models within the statistical based techniques this 
includes: univariate, multivariate, time series, operational, Markov or Marker models, 
and statistical moments (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Univariate models utilize a single metric 
as well as multivariate models that use correlations of two or more metrics to determine 
deviations (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Time series models uses an interval timer with event 
counters or resource measures, then consider the order and time frames of each activity 
and their value, so if at a given time the traffic observed is too low it may be identified as 
an anomaly (Qayyum et al., 2005). The operational model also referred to as the 
threshold metric is based on cardinality of events that happen over a period of time, by 
counting events as they occur, then triggering an alert if the number of events is higher or 
lower than the specified thresholds (Jyothsna et al., 2011). The marker model is also 
known as the ‘Markov model’ which was broken into two approaches: Markov chains 
and hidden Markov models (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009).  
 Cao et al., (2015) identified that hidden Markov models (HMM) using one time 
series data was insufficient and developed an adaptive HMM (AHMAS) with anomaly 
states to detect anomalies based on a sequence of data and not a single value at a point in 
time. Within the Markov model, a Markov chain is a set of states connected by transition 
probabilities anomalies are detected by comparing the associated probability with the 
observed sequence (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). Statistical moments term all identified 
correlations as ‘moments’, if an event occurs above or below an identified moment the 
activity is deemed to be anomalous (Jyothsna et al., 2011). The moment is a mean or 
standard deviation of the correlations, the system determines the confidence interval 
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based on observed user data and does not require prior knowledge of normal activities 
(Qayyum et al., 2005). 
Cognition based anomaly detection consists of finite state machine models, 
description scripts, and adept or expert systems (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Cognition based 
anomaly detection techniques use human input to determine legitimate behaviors by 
having SMEs manually construct the desired model (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). A 
finite state machine (FSM), captures actions (entry, exit, & transition action) in states, an 
action is a description of an activity to be performed at a given moment and contains 
information about the past (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Description scripts are scripting 
languages developed by the Intrusion Detection community to identify attacks based on 
sequences of specific events by describing signatures of attacks (Jyothsna et al., 2011). 
Expert systems classify audit data according to rules, by first identifying different 
attributes, then the classification parameters and procedures are determined, then finally 
the data is classified accordingly (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009).  
Machine learning based anomaly detection consists of Baysian networks, generic 
algorithms, neural networks, fuzzy logic, and outlier detection models (Jyothsna et al., 
2011). Machine learning based anomaly detection techniques are based on explicit of 
implicit models that allow patterns to be analyzed for categorization (Garcia-Teodoro et 
al., 2009). Bayesian networks focus on identifying problematic relationships based on 
integrated prior knowledge (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). The Baysian network model is 
a mathematical framework for combining information to perform estimation by 
combining known information to postulate unknown information (Zaknich, 1998). By 
attaining knowledge through learning neural network models mimic the brain (Garcia-
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Teodoro et al., 2009). Instead of utilizing precise rules, by using approximate rules fuzzy 
logic can improve detection accuracy (Xu, You, & Liu, 2005). Fuzzy logic can be used to 
match any input or output of data by focusing on a range of variability and not just an 
exact outcome this aids with understanding vague or ambiguous information (Dutta et al., 
2013). Genetic algorithms identify deviations with no prior knowledge of the system 
behaviors by using techniques stemming from biology, including inheritance, mutation 
and selection (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). For instance, based on genetic algorithms the 
use of a negative selection algorithm that filters out bad solutions tends to reduce the rate 
of false positives within anomaly detection (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Outliers are unusual 
activities that defer from normal activities (Zhang & Zulkernine, 2006). Outlier detection 
consists of grouping data observations according to a given similarity, based on identified 
similarities each data point is grouped. Points that fall outside of the grouped clusters are 
classified as outliers (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009).  
Patcha and Park (2007) found that “today’s intrusion detection approaches will 
not be able to adequately protect tomorrow’s networks against intrusions and attacks” (p. 
3465). Therefore, anomaly detection methods need to be advanced to address this 
problem. Jyothsna et al. (2011) denoted that identifying features to characterize user and 
system patterns would be the best way to clearly distinguish anomalous activities. Wang 
and Paschalidis (2015) found that existing anomaly detection methods tend to focus on 
stationary assumptions, suggesting there is no change over time, and therefore proposed a 
more robust model for network traffic analysis. Hence, as the anomaly detection methods 
evolve, the systems applying these methods need to be advanced as well. This study 
developed and validated cyber vital signs to be presented within a cybersecurity insider 
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threat dashboard visualization prototype, by incorporating a novel approach to anomaly 
detection using SME identified visualization techniques. 
Table 4 
Summary of Anomaly Detection Techniques Literature 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Cao et al., 
2015 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
Real 
market data of 
seven 
representative 
stocks: 
Google, 
Microsoft, 
Intel, and 
Apple from 
NASDAQ, 
ARM, 
BARCLAYS, 
and Vodafone 
against  
OCSVM, 
kNN, and 
GMM models 
 
Detection 
algorithm, 
adaptive 
hidden Markov 
model with 
anomaly states  
(HMMAS) 
The comparison of 
proposed approach 
with other 
benchmark models, 
OCSVM, kNN, and 
GMM, 
has shown that the 
AHMMAS 
performs better in 
terms of 
the area under ROC 
curve and the F-
measure, 
respectively. 
Chandola, 
Banerjee, & 
Kumar, 2009 
 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Anomaly 
detection 
Current 
research has been 
done in an 
unstructured 
fashion, without 
relying on a unified 
notion of 
anomalies, which 
makes the job of 
providing a 
theoretical 
understanding of 
the anomaly 
detection problem. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Anomaly Detection Techniques Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Dutta et al., 
2013 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
Using one 
investigator 
data was 
captured from 
the 
experiment: 
(top to 
bottom): 
angle, 
footplate 
force, ECG, 
blood 
pressure. 
Fuzzy logic, 
decision 
support 
Computational 
approach 
to monitoring vital 
signs since the 
purpose of such 
alerts is to provide 
decision support 
inputs to careers, to 
prompt closer 
observations or 
direct interventions 
to be performed to 
help the subjects of 
care. 
 
Garcia-
Teodoro et al., 
2009 
 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Anomaly-
based 
network 
intrusion 
detection 
systems (A-
NIDS) 
Faster and 
more effective 
countermeasures 
are needed to cope 
with the 
ever-growing 
number of detected 
attacks. 
 
Jyothsna, 
Prasad, & 
Prasad, 2011 
 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Intrusion, 
anomaly-
based, and 
signature based 
detection 
 
Faster and more 
effective 
countermeasures 
are needed to cope 
up with the attacks 
ever-growing. 
Patan, 2015 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
Signals from a 
boiler 
A recurrent 
neural network 
with open-loop 
control system 
 
In spite of 
proper work of the 
developed control 
algorithms, 
selecting  
control parameters 
were still a 
challenge. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Anomaly Detection Techniques Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Patcha & 
Park, 2007 
 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Anomaly 
detection 
Traditional 
intrusion detection 
systems 
have not adapted 
adequately to new 
networking 
paradigms like 
wireless and mobile 
networks 
nor have they 
scaled to meet the 
requirements posed 
by high-speed 
networks. 
 
Qayyum, 
Islam, & 
Jamil, 2005 
 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Anomaly 
detection, 
intrusion 
detection, 
security threats 
 
Advantages and 
disadvantages of  
various techniques 
for anomaly 
detection. 
Wang & 
Paschalidis, 
2015 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
 Network 
anomaly 
detection 
The statistical 
properties of normal 
traffic are time-
varying 
for most actual 
communication 
networks. 
 
Xu, You, & 
Liu, 2005 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
Mackey-Glass 
Time series 
and a publicly 
available data 
set 
Negative 
selection, 
genetic 
algorithm, 
fuzzy logic 
Combined negative 
selection and 
genetic algorithm to 
develop a novel 
fuzzy rules based 
approach to system 
performance 
detection. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Anomaly Detection Techniques Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Zaknich, 1998 
 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 modified 
probabilistic 
neural 
network, 
general 
regression 
neural network 
Introduced the 
MPNN and 
described its 
relation to Specht’s 
GRNN, MPNN has 
some advantages 
over other neural 
networks in 
nonlinear signal 
processing 
applications. 
 
Zhang & 
Zulkernine, 
2006 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
Attack data Network 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Systems 
A new framework 
for unsupervised 
anomaly NIDS 
based on the outlier 
detection technique 
in random forests 
algorithm. 
 
 
Insider Threat Analytic Indicators 
 An insider threat analytic indicator, or for the purpose of this study, cyber 
visualization variables, are defined as outputs that may indicate an insider threat and 
prompts for further analysis (Casey, 2015). Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak (2012) 
suggested that automated and manual countermeasures may be utilized for mitigation 
based on indicators that could suggest an increased risk. Alahmadi, Legg, and Nurse 
(2015) proposed that a more comprehensive analytic approach incorporating a diverse set 
of data with sources from technological, behavioral, and physiological monitoring is 
more effective in recognition, detection and response to insider threats. Casey, Koeberl, 
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and Vishik (2010) stressed the importance of threat agent analysis to help form a 
“coherent picture of the threat space and priorities of remediation” (p. 1).  
Casey (2007) developed a model for simplified depiction of threat agents. The 
Threat Agent Library (TAL) provides a consistent reference library describing the human 
agents involved in IT systems and that could pose threats to such kind of systems, 
although not limited to insider threats (Nostro, Ceccarelli, Bondavalli, & Brancati, 2013). 
Carcary (2013) noted the TAL as applicable for effective risk management. Ceccarelli et 
al. (2015) notes that identifying possible human agents that could pose a threat to IS can 
be very challenging, and the TAL provides a standardized set of agents. The TAL 
allowed for easy classification of insider threat agents and variables (see Figure 4). 
Insider attacks are difficult to detect, and many attackers operate within their 
granted restrictions, thus, identification of potential threat agents aided in insider threat 
mitigation (Nostro et al., 2013). In this study, cyber visualization variables were 
identified using SMEs. In order to identify insider threats and the variables associated 
with potential threats, an understanding of who a potential threat agent is needed 
(Callegati, Giallorenzo, Melis, & Prandini, 2016). This study presents a novel way of 
addressing the prevailing problem faced when detecting malicious cyber insiders. 
Consequently, Figure 5 presents insider threat agent types as malicious, non-malicious, or 
either. This study focused on potential threats that are highlighted in Figure 5, these threat 
agents are identified as ‘malicious or either’. The threat agents within the scope of this 
study are identified as: vendors, partners, irrational individuals, thief, disgruntled 
individuals, activists, terrorists, organized crime, competitors, and nation states. 
Depending upon the type of threat agent correlated attack types are depicted. Nostro et al. 
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(2013) utilized this predefined library of insiders in order to efficiently perform tasks 
relevant to the focus of their study and show completeness of the assessment of insiders. 
The same approach has been utilized for the purpose of this study.  
 
Figure 5: Threat Agent Library (TAL)(Casey, 2007) 
 
Casey (2007) also presented analytics based on attack types, providing a 
comprehensive list of analytic indicators. For the purpose of this study, these analytic 
indicators provided a foundation as the initial list of critical cyber visualization variables. 
Based on the variable and type of analytic indicator the determination of whether the 
variable is applicable when identifying potentially malicious cyber insiders can be 
determined. Data associated with the identified variable needs to be depicted in the 
developed cyber visualization. Wang and Jones (2017) suggested that flows, logs and 
system events (alerts) are typically used for intrusion detection. Cappelli et al. (2012) 
identified that log traffic may be inspected for indicators of “suspicious access, large file 
transfers, suspicious email traffic, after-hours access, or use of removable media by 
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resigning employees” (p. 93). Brdiczka et al. (2012) denoted that model variables can be 
associated with observable indicators. Figure 6 depicts an initial set of variables for the 
identification of potentially malicious insider cyber threats, and the associated data. 
 
Figure 6: Initial Analytic Variables and Data Types (Casey, 2015) 
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Table 5 
Summary of Insider Threat Analytic Indicators Literature 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Alahmadi, 
Legg, & 
Nurse, 2015 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
1000 
randomly 
selected 
websites 
Website–
OCEAN 
personality 
correlation 
tool, insider 
threat 
application 
An individuals 
browsing interests 
can lead to 
inferences about 
their personality 
traits, and if 
monitored can be 
utilized to identify 
potential insider 
threat. 
 
Brdiczka, 
Price, Shen, 
Patil, Chow, 
Bart, & 
Ducheneaut, 
2012 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
350,000 
multi-player 
online game 
characters 
observed 
over a period 
of 6 months 
Structural 
anomaly 
detection, 
psychological 
context 
modeling 
An approach for 
proactive detection 
of insider threats by 
combining 
structural anomaly 
detection, 
information 
networks, and 
psychological 
profiling of 
individuals.  
 
Callegati, 
Giallorenzo, 
Melis, & 
Prandini, 2016 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Threat agents Developing a 
Federated 
marketplace of 
services called 
SMAll, aimed at 
harmonizing data 
flows and service 
invocations. 
 
Cappelli, 
Moore, & 
Trzeciak, 
2012 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
CERT 
Database 
Theft, 
sabotage, fraud 
Identification of 
types of insiders 
with varying 
motives of why 
they perform 
malicious activities. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Insider Threat Analytic Indicators Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Carcary, 2013 Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Risk 
management 
A new IT Risk 
Management 
maturity model. 
 
Casey, 
Koeberl, & 
Vishik, 2010 
Theoretical  Threat agents, 
threat agent 
library (TAL) 
 
Standardization of 
threat agents. 
Ceccarelli, 
Montecchi, 
Brancati, 
Lollini, 
Marguglio, & 
Bondavalli, 
2015 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
Data for four 
different 
biometric 
traits applied 
within a math 
lab 
Context 
aware security 
by hierarchical 
multilevel 
architectures 
(CASHMA), 
TAL, ADVISE 
(ADversary 
VIew Security 
Evaluation) 
modeling 
formalism 
 
Utilized biometrics 
to define a protocol 
for continuous 
authentication that 
improves security 
and usability of user 
sessions. 
Nostro, 
Ceccarelli, 
Bondavalli, & 
Brancati, 2013 
Empirical 
study via case 
study 
A service 
oriented 
system 
TAL, ADVISE 
(ADversary 
VIew Security 
Evaluation) 
modeling 
formalism 
Defined the 
motivations and 
targets of insiders, 
investigate the 
likeliness 
and severity of 
potential violations, 
and identified 
appropriate 
countermeasures. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Insider Threat Analytic Indicators Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Wang & 
Jones, 2017 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Big data 
analytics, 
anomaly 
detection, 
misuse 
detection 
Methods for 
network intrusion 
detection, stream 
data characteristics 
and stream 
processing systems, 
feature extraction 
and data reduction, 
conventional data 
mining and machine 
learning, deep 
learning, and Big 
Data analytics in 
network intrusion 
detection. 
 
Information Visualization 
Information visualization is defined as communicating and perceiving data, both 
abstract and scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014). Using 
effective visualization interfaces within cybersecurity allows the ability to understand 
anomalies using data from complex cyber networks (Inibhunu et al., 2016). Rohrer and 
Swing (1997) attested that when dealing with unstructured data utilizing the proper visual 
mapping would be essential for producing effective visualizations. However, Fink et al. 
(2009) noted that most cyber analysis still utilized archaic command-line tools that are 
ineffective at presenting large volumes of rapidly moving data. Choi, Lee, and Kim 
(2009) proposed a new visualization technique to detect anomalies from Internet attacks 
since traditional IDSs were not able to detect unknown attacks without triggering a 
significant amount of false positive alerts. Visualizations should be useful in presenting 
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unstructured data, and not only be valuable in presenting an outcome once it is already 
known (Kandel, Paepcke, Hellerstein, & Heer, 2012).  
Inibhunu et al. (2016) argued that using level of detail viewing would increase 
performance and decrease information overload, facilitating effective mitigation 
decisions within cybersecurity. Fink et al. (2009) believed large, high-resolution displays 
with interoperable, flexible, and compelling visualization tools are core components of a 
usable workspace for cyber analysts. However, they did not examine how the actual 
information displayed using the visualizations should be enhanced to support cyber 
analysts. Since the focus of the visualizations that were being developed were not being 
tailored towards the needs of a cybersecurity analyst. After surveying 32 analysts, Kandel 
et al. (2012) found that analysts would like visualizations that allow them to apply 
advanced analytics routines, explore models, and visualize the output. McKenna et al. 
(2015) identified that more cyber visualizations need to be developed from the 
perspective of cybersecurity analysts. 
McKenna, Mazur, Agutter, and Meyer (2014) provided a framework for 
actionable guidance throughout the visualization design process by focusing on two 
models for visualization design, decision models to capture the rational behind the 
decisions designers make, and process models capturing the actions made. This allowed 
visualization designers to verify and validate design decisions, allowing the final design 
to be more applicable to the real world. McKenna et al. (2015) assessed that only 40% of 
visualization research gathered user needs prior to developing a tool, thus, they assessed 
user needs within cybersecurity, developed, and then validated the visualization. 
However, the validation was only performed with one cybersecurity analyst. Walton et al. 
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(2015) noted that there are multiple shortcomings of visual analytics workflows proposed 
a scalable loop for continuous improvements of the models being used to contribute to 
the development of more proactive and visual models. While McKenna et al. (2015) as 
well as Walton et al. (2015) approached the cyber visualization problem from a user 
focused perspective, the resultant models developed do not hone in on the user of interest 
or potential malicious insider. Therefore, the analysts needed to determine this based on 
the presented visualizations.  
Table 6 
Summary of Information Visualization Literature 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Choi, Lee, & 
Kim, 2009 
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
A real-life 
Internet attack 
traffic trace 
(Network 
packets) 
Traffic flow 
generator 
The development of 
parallel coordinate 
attack visualization 
(PCAV) a real-time 
visualization system 
for anomaly 
detection. 
 
Fink, North, 
Endert, & 
Rose, 2009  
 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
8 cyber 
analysts at a 
government 
laboratory  
 
Visualization Designed usable 
workspaces for 
cyber analysts. 
Inibhunu et 
al., 2016 
 
Empirical 
study via data 
analysis 
Millions of 
records from 
firewall and 
IDS logs for a 
fictitious 
organization 
Cyber situation 
awareness 
Level of detail 
viewing can greatly 
increase human 
performance by 
mitigating 
information 
overload.  
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Table 6 
Summary of Information Visualization Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Kandel, 
Paepcke, 
Hellerstein, & 
Heer, 2012 
 
Empirical 
study via 
interviews 
35 data 
analysts in a 
commercial 
organization 
Visualization As the scale and 
diversity of data 
sources increases 
within enterprises, 
there is an 
opportunity for 
visual analytic tools 
to improve the 
quality of analysis 
and the speed at 
which it takes place. 
 
McKenna et 
al., 2015 
 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Design activity 
framework, 
cognitive task 
analysis 
 
Personas, their 
behaviors, and their 
knowledge played a 
critical role in 
helping to decide 
which users 
and needs to target 
in the visualization 
design process. 
 
Roberts et al., 
2014 
 
Theoretical  Visualization Visualization 
researchers should 
exploit the 
experience gained 
over the last two 
decades in virtual 
reality (VR) 
research, while 
continuing to apply 
VR technology to 
visualization 
systems. 
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Table 6 
Summary of Information Visualization Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Rohrer & 
Swing, 1997 
 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Information 
visualization 
Interlinking 
visualization 
components with 
other Web media 
and data is useful 
since it offers fairly 
seamless integration 
of related 
information for end 
users. 
 
Walton et al., 
2015 
 
Empirical 
study via case 
study 
 
Selection of 
visualizations 
from the 
system, 
CITD 
(Corporate 
Insider Threat 
Detection) 
Dashboard 
Dashboard 
visualization 
 
Introduced a visual 
analytics loop for 
protective 
monitoring in 
cybersecurity 
applications, and a 
prototype tool 
demonstrating an 
example 
implementation of 
the approach. 
 
 
IS Effectiveness 
Though prior studies have struggled to define effectiveness as well as how to 
accurately measure effectiveness (Bailey & Pearson, 1983; Doll, Xia, & Torkzadeh, 
1994; Lee, Kim, & Lee, 1995). Effectiveness has been defined as the extent to which the 
IS contributes to the accomplishment of objectives (Kim, 1989). Levy (2006) denoted 
that the complete measurement of IS effectiveness must include measures of the causal 
factors or ‘values’ as well as the end result construct or ‘user satisfaction’ (p. 60). Levy, 
Murphy, and Zanakis (2010) emphasized the importance of value as an important 
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construct within IS research. Levy (2006) denoted that Value Theory and User 
Satisfaction theory suggests that values impact attitudes which impact behaviors, and in 
turn impacts satisfaction (p. 6). Therefore, this study addressed perceived effectiveness as 
a measure of value and satisfaction.  
User satisfaction with an IS is related to the utilization and success of a system, 
and can be measured in an effort to improve the system (Bailey & Pearson, 1983). Levy 
(2006) indicated that satisfaction should be measured as a ‘surrogate’ for measurement of 
IS effectiveness (p. 42). Bano, Zowghi, and Rimini (2017) found that user involvement in 
the development process leads to higher levels of user satisfaction. Kurucay and Inan 
(2017) stated that user satisfaction is a strong determinant of effectiveness. User 
satisfaction is an important theoretical issue, however, Doll et al. (1994) argued that it is a 
one-dimensional construct. Bailey and Pearson (1983) argued satisfaction is a bi-
dimensional attitude, thus, the intensity of an individuals reaction relative to the 
information requirements must also be measured (Bailey & Pearson, 1983). Bano et al. 
(2017) also confirmed satisfaction to be bi-dimensional, as it entails user satisfaction with 
their involvement process and satisfaction with the delivered product.  
Value is defined as the core belief about a level of importance that the user 
attributes to the system (Levy, 2006; Hackney, Dooley, Levy, & Parrish, 2015; Dooley, 
Levy, Hackney, & Parrish, 2017). The expectancy value-theory explains motivation as a 
combination of the users needs and the value of the goals in the system (Sigaard & Skov, 
2015). According to Sedera, Lokuge, Grover, Sarker, and Sarker (2016) for innovation to 
take hold within systems their needs to be increased value. For this study the developed 
cyber visualization prototype was considered effective when the SMEs perceive the 
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developed prototype as highly important and the SMEs are highly satisfied with the 
visualizations (Levy, 2006). Levy (2006) used a Likert-type rating scale for assessing 
value items. Sedera et al. (2016) utilized a 7-point Likert rating scale to assess value of 
enterprise systems and digital platforms, finding that digital platforms can yield 
innovation, only through the moderation of the enterprise system platforms. Kurucay and 
Inan (2017) utilized a 5-point Likert rating scale to determine student satisfaction with 
online learning, to gauge the effectiveness of the online course. Thus, this study utilized a 
7-point Likert-type rating scale for satisfaction and value assessment. 
Table 7 
Summary of IS Effectiveness Literature 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Bailey & 
Pearson, 1983 
Empirical 
study via 
survey and 
case study 
29 
questionnaires
; 32 manager 
interviews  
 
Survey using a 
seven-point 
scale of 
satisfaction 
Measurement of IS 
user satisfaction. 
 
Bano, 
Zowghi, & 
Rimini, 2017 
Empirical 
study via case 
study 
interviews 
Secondary 
data from two 
case studies, 
12 subjects 
Three-point 
scale of 
satisfaction 
User satisfaction is 
considered to 
contribute to system 
success. 
Doll, Xia, & 
Torkzadeh, 
1994 
Empirical 
study via 
survey 
409 computer 
users  
End user 
computing 
satisfaction 
(EUCS) 
Validation that the 
12-item EUCS 
instrument explains 
and measures user 
satisfaction. 
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Table 7 
Summary of IS Effectiveness Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Doskey, 
Mazzuchi, & 
Sarkani, 2015 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
27 
competencies  
compared on 
successful and 
challenged 
projects 
Effectiveness, 
Bayesian belief 
network, SE 
REI 
System engineering 
(SE) Relative 
Effectiveness Index 
(REI) model can be 
used to assess SE 
performance. 
Harrati, 
Bouchrika, 
Tari, & 
Ladjailia, 
2016 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
50 lecturers 
from the 
Computer 
Science and 
Electrical 
Engineering 
at different 
universities 
 
System 
Usability Scale 
(SUS) 
System Usability 
Scale is not 
adequately a 
standalone measure 
for expressing the 
true acceptance 
and satisfaction. 
Kurucay & 
Inan, 2017 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
77 students in 
an online 
course 
24 items on a 
five-point 
Likert scale 
Interaction among 
learners in online 
courses lead the 
higher student 
satisfaction. 
 
Lee, Kim, & 
Lee, 1995 
Empirical 
study via case 
study and 
survey 
236 end users 
from 11 
companies 
Satisfaction, 
EUCS 
There is a strong 
relationship among 
end-user IS 
acceptance, IS 
satisfaction and job 
satisfaction. 
 
Levy, 2006 Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
192 
undergraduate 
students 
IS 
Effectiveness, 
LeVIS index, 
EUCS 
Identifying and 
defining the 
relationship 
between value and 
satisfaction in order 
to indicate IS 
effectiveness. 
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Table 7 
Summary of IS Effectiveness Literature (continued) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Sigaard & 
Skov, 2015 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
7 
professionals 
who seek 
information as 
a job 
Expectancy 
value theory,  
The theory of 
expectancy-value 
more directly 
measures the effect 
of subjectively 
perceived value and 
perception of own 
capability on 
information-seeking 
behavior. 
 
Sedera, 
Lokuge, 
Grover, 
Sarker, & 
Sarker, 2016 
Empirical 
study via 
experiment 
189 
organization 
Effectiveness, 
seven-point 
Likert scale  
Digital platforms 
can yield 
innovation, only 
through the 
moderation of the 
enterprise system 
platforms. 
 
 
Summary of What is Known and Unknown in Research Literature 
 In this section a review of literature was performed on constructs applicable to 
anomaly and intrusion detection. As a result, constructs relevant constructs applicable to 
anomaly and intrusion detection when assessing insider threat detection were identified. 
The presented literature review provides a summary of what is known and unknown 
within anomaly and intrusion detection as it pertains to identifying anomalous activities 
of malicious cyber insiders. 
 Problems within cybersecurity are different from traditional security problems, 
since cybersecurity issues involve human intelligence applied in order to circumvent the 
standard operations of a system. Solving cybersecurity issues require a different approach 
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(Toecker, 2014). Nations rely upon cyber systems that may inherently possess many 
vulnerabilities, and if exploited could be defibrillating (Harknett & Stever, 2011). It is 
unknown if national strategies account for technical, tactical, and operational advances in 
cybersecurity. Another problem within cybersecurity pertains to anomaly detection 
systems, which are a subset of intrusion detection systems, however, IDSs are not 
adequate for detecting anomalous activities (Patcha & Park, 2007). An anomaly detection 
system utilizing the applicable anomaly detection technique would be best suited for the 
detection of unknown activities (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Parsing through unknown 
activities to determine normal versus anomalous activities can be difficult for cyber 
analysts. Thus, cyber analysts struggle with analytic-focus or processing large volumes of 
data and providing valuable insights (Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). Though 
Shneiderman and Plaisant (2015) identified multiple focusing strategies, they were 
unable to determine which strategies are relevant in what situation.  
Visualizations will assist cyber analysts by helping them to identify problems and 
work towards a viable solution (Fink et al., 2009). Using visualization interfaces in 
cybersecurity allows for better understanding of anomalies when interacting with data 
from complex cyber networks (Inibhunu et al., 2016). Though visualizations were 
identified as an appropriate method for anomaly identification, methods for the 
integration of a ‘FocalPoint’ and classifying an adequate display interface were to be 
determined. Therefore, the development of a visualization prototype that visualized 
already parsed data in a consumable form factor pertinent to cyber professionals better 
enable detection and prevention of malicious cyber insider threats. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Overview of Research Design 
The study is grounded in developmental research and was conducted in three 
phases, as depicted in Figure 7, to develop and validate the newly designed prototype that 
aided in identifying anomalous activities of malicious cyber insiders. This developmental 
research developed a prototype, identified as a ‘thing’ in order to address a problem, 
which is considered the foundation of developmental research by Ellis and Levy (2009). 
The critical cyber visualization variables were identified and ranked based on SMEs’ 
input utilizing the Delphi method. As a result, the initial version of QUICK.v™ was 
developed.  
First, the critical cyber visualization variables are identified and ranked. Then 
simulated data was utilized to depict complex cyber data correlations and the top six 
critical cyber visualization variables to the SME participants. In order to determine the 
valid visualization techniques that should be applied within the developed cyber 
visualization prototype QUICK.v™. Next, based on the identified visualization 
techniques, the preliminary prototype was refined to apply the techniques identified as 
most valid when presenting complex data correlations and the top six critical cyber 
visualization variables. Subsequently, this study validated the perceived effectiveness of 
the developed prototype using SME analysis. To determine the perceived effectiveness of 
QUICK.v™, quantitative data was collected based on each SMEs rating of the 
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prototypes’ value and their level of satisfaction. Finally, the finalized version of 
QUICK.v™ as well as the visualization techniques used was detailed within the findings 
and recommendations. Identifying and assessing the risk score is beyond the scope of this 
study. Risk calculation was addressed in the AI-InCyThR™ prototype (Hueca et al., 
2016).   
 
 
Figure 7: Research Design Process for the Development of a 
Cybersecurity Visualization Prototype 
 
Phase 1 
Phase one consisted of an exploratory study. This approach is generally taken 
when little is known about the problem at hand or no information is available on how 
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similar problems have been solved (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Legg et al. (2015) 
identified the insider threat topic as recently attaining attention within research and that 
real-world data is rarely used to address the problem. With the recent growth of big data 
analytics and the integration of many diverse data sources, new research solutions are 
needed for monitoring and analysis (Boukri & Chaoui, 2015). With the limited amount of 
research currently addressing the problem of detecting malicious cyber insiders, an 
exploratory research method is appropriate for this study. To identify the critical cyber 
visualization variables needed when displaying complex data correlations, extensive 
literature analysis was performed for the foundation of this research. With the completion 
of an extensive literature analysis to develop a better understanding of the research 
problem and formulate the research questions, each phase of this study was performed. 
Phase one of this research included two parts. First, it identified the critical cyber 
visualization variables using SMEs that should be displayed when using applications to 
detect potentially malicious insider cyber threats. Second, the first phase of this study 
provided the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that 
should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat dashboard visualization 
prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber insider activities.  
Research question one was addressed in phase one by obtaining critical cyber 
visualization variables from SMEs over multiple Delphi iterations. Research question two 
also addressed in phase one by obtaining the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical 
cyber visualization variables that should be displayed. SMEs’ was used to validate and 
rank order the critical cybersecurity visualization variables identified in literature (see 
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Appendix A), the developed cyber visualization prototype should incorporate that may 
aid in identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber threats.  
SMEs were asked to review the initial list of cyber variables obtained within 
literature and select the most critical variables from this list. SMEs were then asked to 
add any additional variables they deem as critical, but are not displayed in the initial list. 
Next, the SMEs were asked to select their top six critical variables from the list they have 
created. SME responses were considered for the next round of data collection, based on 
prior selections. The final sets of cyber variables selected were then reviewed with the 
SMEs’. SMEs were asked to validate the list by adding or removing variables; once the 
list is finalized those variables were applied moving forward. This addressed research 
question one - what are SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that should 
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider cyber 
threats?  
After the SMEs’ critical cyber visualization variables have been validated, they 
were asked to rank the order of the critical cyber visualization variables the developed 
prototype should include that may aid in identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber 
threats. Research question two also addressed in phase one by obtaining the ranking of 
the critical cyber visualization variables from SMEs over multiple Delphi iterations. The 
SMEs were presented the finalized list of variables and asked to rank the variables from 
most-to-least important. The SMEs were asked to provide a rank order for the identified 
variables in relation to how imperative that data is as a precursor when investigating 
potentially malicious cybersecurity insider threats. The highest weighted variables 
identified were referred to as cybersecurity ‘vital signs’. The ranking was analyzed to 
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determine the final top six critical cyber visualization variables. This addressed research 
question two - what is the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization 
variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat dashboard 
visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber insider activities?  
Participants in phase one consisted of at least 30 SMEs. From the group of 30 
SMEs a focus group was selected to validate the final list of identified critical cyber 
visualization variables. Focus group participants consisted of eight to ten of the most 
experienced SMEs. Experience was based on number of years worked within 
cybersecurity, based on the SMEs demographic information. Applying the Delphi 
technique within a virtual lab environment, each SMEs was asked to review a list of 
critical cyber variables and identify the rank order of identified critical cyber 
visualization variables used when monitoring for potentially malicious cybersecurity 
insider threats.  
Phase 2 
Participants within phase two consisted of at least 30 SMEs. Phase two also 
consisted of two parts. SMEs first identified the most valid visualization techniques to 
present complex cyber data correlations. Second, phase two identified the visualization 
techniques most valid to present top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect 
potentially malicious cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber 
visualization prototype QUICK.v™. In phase one, the validated and ranked critical cyber 
visualization variables that have been collected from SMEs were applied within phase 
two. This consisted of SMEs’ identifying the most valid presentation of complex data 
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correlations using the identified critical visualization variables over multiple visualization 
techniques.  
In phase two, the preliminary prototype was developed using the ranked 
cybersecurity vital signs identified by the SMEs in phase one. SMEs were presented each 
vital sign using three different visualization techniques and asked to select their preferred 
visualization technique for presenting complex cyber data correlations. Once an initial set 
of visualization technique has been identified, the SMEs were presented options for the 
most utilized visualization techniques found in literature. This addressed the research 
question three - what SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present 
complex cyber data correlations relevant to the predesignated critical cyber visualization 
variables that are applied in the developed cyber visualization prototype QUICK.v™? 
Second, phase two identified visualization techniques that are most valid when 
presenting the top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially malicious 
cyber insider activities. Based on the validated and ranked critical cyber visualization 
variables identified in phase one, SME analysis were performed of the most valid 
visualization technique for presenting the top six critical cyber visualization variables. 
The preliminary prototype was refined to implement the validated SME criteria for the 
visualization design. Not all of the SME identified variables were able to be applied to 
QUICK.v™, the rank order from phase one was vital to determining which variables are 
presented using a validated visualization techniques. This addressed the RQ4 - what 
SMEs identified visualization techniques are most valid to present top six critical cyber 
visualization variables to detect potentially malicious cyber insider activities that are 
applied within the developed cyber visualization prototype QUICK.v™? 
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The vital signs were presented to at least 30 cybersecurity and visualization SMEs 
using the most applicable visualization technique as identified in literature. Using the 
Delphi method the SMEs were asked to perform an analysis of the visualization 
techniques employed to present the complex cyber data correlations and each 
cybersecurity vital sign. This study controlled the visualization techniques used in the 
final prototype. Once SMEs have identified the critical cyber visualization variables and 
the most valid visualization techniques, modifications may need to be made to fit the 
form factor of the final prototype. Researcher interference was involved since the sample 
and the configuration of the prototype developed was controlled in the study.  
Data collection was performed using an experiment in a contrived setting. Using a 
contrived setting allowed for extensive control over the experiment, as well as allow for 
control of external nuisance factors (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). A lab environment was 
utilized for each experiment allowing quantitative and qualitative data to be captured 
from the participants. A lab experiment also allowed for the selection of a homogenous 
set of participants, or participants with similar backgrounds in cybersecurity. Selecting 
similar participants added to the validity of this study by allowing the measured effects to 
be based on a particular group (Levy & Ellis, 2011). In relation to this study the selected 
group was cybersecurity and visualization SMEs.  
Phase 3 
Participants within phase three consisted of at least 20 SMEs. Phase three entailed 
conducting and experimental study using SMEs’ to assess the perceived effectiveness of 
the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating malicious insiders. In the third phase another 
virtual lab experiment was performed within a contrived setting. In this experiment the 
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SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables and visualization techniques 
identified within phase one and obtaining the perceived effectiveness of the developed 
prototype validated two. The effectiveness measure was based on the level of satisfaction 
and value measures obtained from the SMEs. These individual scores was used to 
determine the perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™, based on the results of the data 
analysis performed on the quantitative data gathered from the cybersecurity SMEs. This 
addressed RQ5 - what is the SMEs’ implied effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction and 
value/importance) of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating potentially malicious 
cyber insider threats? Then, the validated QUICK.v™ prototype was presented along 
with recommendations and conclusions.  
 
Instruments and Prototype Development 
When visualizations are designed often times there are no explicit connections 
stated as to why the designer chose to utilize a particular technique Mckenna et al. (2014) 
addressed this problem by developing the design activity framework to directly connect 
each design activity with the corresponding design decision. Mckenna et al. (2015) 
identified the lack of developmental research utilizing cyber analyst or SME input 
throughout the design process. However, they struggled with obtaining direct access to 
cyber analysts. Using feedback from one cyber analyst qualitative coding of the current 
body of knowledge was applied. Additionally, Inibhunu et al. (2016) sought to increase 
the perceived effectiveness of cyber visualization tools by developing a system to provide 
adaptive level of detail in the interface. While the system was introduced the 
effectiveness of the system developed was not determined (Inibhunu et al., 2016).  
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Insider threat detection is a complex problem for cyber analysts. Walton et al. 
(2015) proposed a scalable visual analytics loop for continuous development of detection 
models. Nevertheless, there are limitations within today’s cyber visualizations and 
additional work to advance visualizations is needed. However, input from cyber analysts 
is essential to develop and evaluate the perceived effectiveness, thus the resultant cyber 
visualization may be ready for real world application. The goal of this study is to develop 
and validate a cyber insider threat dashboard visualization prototype. To develop novel 
cyber visualizations, SME input was utilized for the development and evaluation of this 
research as depicted in Figure 8, a missing element among earlier works. The 
development process for QUICK.v™ included the following steps. Step one includes 
utilizing SMEs to identify the relevant cyber visualization variables. Step two consisted 
of identifying the rank order of the visualization variables previously identified. Step 
three used the identified visualization variables to determine valid visualization 
techniques. Step four included applying the visualization variables and the validated 
visualization techniques to the development of QUICK.v™. Finally, step six assessed the 
perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™. 
         
 
73
 
Figure 8: QUICK.v™ Development Process to Enhance 
Perceived Effectiveness by Assessing Satisfaction and Value 
Instrument for SMEs Identification of Cyber Visualization Variables 
 In order to identify the cyber visualization variables SMEs were given the survey 
instrument presented in Appendix D. Appendix A depicts a template for how the 
qualitative survey was administered to the SME’s.  A survey refers to “gathering 
information about the characteristics, actions, or opinions of a large group of people, 
referred to as a population” (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993, p. 2). For this survey the 
population consisted of cybersecurity analysts. By using survey research, information 
was gathered for measurement and understanding, thus, qualitative information was 
gathered to describe an aspect of the studied population, which in this case were the cyber 
visualization variables (Pinsonneault, & Kraemer, 1993). The survey consisted of 
presenting pertinent terms in relation to the scope of this research. Next, SMEs were 
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asked to identify data variables and rank their identified variables in relation to 
identifying insider threats. Variables utilized were deemed as cybersecurity vital signs 
that were ranked by the SME. Overlapping variables identified by the SMEs were 
assessed based on the denoted prioritization, then translated into linked objectives to 
group similar variables into cybersecurity vital signs (Keeney, 1999). The results from 
this survey were used to address research question one and two by identifying and 
ranking using SMEs the critical cyber visualization variables that should be displayed 
when using applications to detect potentially malicious insiders cyber threats.  
Instrument for SMEs Identification of Visualization Technique for Cyber Variables 
 Once the cybersecurity vital signs have been identified, the next step is to 
determine the appropriate visualization techniques for each vital sign. The qualitative 
survey in Appendix G was administered to SMEs using their criteria for visualizing each 
of the depicted cyber visualization variables. Appendix B depicts a template for how the 
qualitative survey was administered to the SME’s. The final visualization techniques for 
each variable was updated and applied within this survey instrument once data collection 
and analysis utilizing Appendix D was completed. Thus, allowing for the identification of 
the most valid visualization techniques to present the top six critical cyber visualization 
variables, therefore, Appendix B was only for illustration purposes. In Appendix B 
segments of the preliminary prototype were presented to the SMEs depicting the cyber 
visualization variables they previously identified. Simulated data was used within the 
prototype to allow SMEs to assess and identify the data points they referenced, as well as 
their preferred technique of depicting the presented information. The prototype 
development was iterative; this involved several stages of information and user input 
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since initial prototypes tend to be tossed because of poorly understood requirements that 
are later validated based upon the preliminary prototype. However, throughout this 
process much experience is gained allowing for the development of a production quality 
prototype (Ozcan & Morrey, 1995). In this study, exclusion of the preliminary prototype 
may be avoided by presenting the components that make up the final prototype to the 
SMEs for validation. This survey consisted of presenting individual cyber visualization 
variables as identified by the SMEs using varying visualization techniques. The SMEs 
were asked to select their preferred technique for the depicted cyber visualization 
variable. The results from this survey, addressed research question three by identifying 
using SMEs the most valid visualization techniques to present complex cyber data 
correlations relevant to the predesignated critical cyber visualization variables.  
QUICK.v™ Prototype Development 
 The prototype included validated visualization techniques for effective 
presentation of cyber visualization variables. Based on visualization techniques as 
identified in literature and validated by the SMEs, the techniques that are ideal for 
presenting the SME identified cyber related data would be identified and administered 
within QUICK.v™. This conceptual design is depicted in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Conceptual Design for QUICK.v™  
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 Once each cyber visualization variable was obtained and ranked, an ideal 
visualization technique was identified for the presentation of that cyber visualization 
variable within the display. The SMEs were able to validate or identify other manners 
they deem as best to depict the relevant cyber visualization variable. The validated 
visualization techniques were then used to develop QUICK.v™. For each identified cyber 
visualization variable the expert was asked to assign a weight. Based on the assigned 
weight of each cyber visualization variable the variable rank order was determined. 
Visualization techniques were identified for the pertinent cyber visualization variables. 
The techniques applied were then used to build the dashboard-based presentation of the 
QUICK.v™ prototype.  Based on SME input many visualization techniques were taken 
into consideration for this prototype, based on literature some may include chord, sankey, 
dendograms, or line chart diagrams. Chou, Wang, and Ma (2016) identified sankey 
diagrams as being visually informative and utilized sankey diagrams to present data flows 
allowing for the identification of potential privacy concerns. Noel (2011) utilized 
dendograms to visualize cyber attack patterns since this provided an automated and 
mathematically sound way to present the hierarchical attack clusters. The selected 
visualization techniques were presented to SMEs for evaluation. SMEs were utilized to 
determine if the appropriate visualization technique has been selected to present the 
SMEs’ previously identified cyber visualization variables. 
Instrument for Cybersecurity Analysts’ Effectiveness of the Prototype  
 Once the QUICK.v™ prototype has been developed based on the SME identified 
cyber visualization variables and visualization techniques, the perceived effectiveness of 
the developed prototype were measured. Using SMEs the perceived effectiveness of the 
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cyber visualization variables presented and the visualization techniques used were 
identified. Effectiveness refers to usefulness or productive use of the technology that may 
affect job performance and utilitarian value, which also plays a significant role in user 
acceptance of the technology (Levy, 2006; Dooley, Hackney, Dooley, Levy, & Parrish, 
2015; Coursaris & van Osch, 2016; Levy, Hackney, & Parrish, 2017). Hong, Tai, Hwang, 
Kuo, and Chen (2017) utilized determinants of satisfaction and utility value within 150 
questionnaires to determine effectiveness of using government e-learning systems. IS 
effectiveness has been difficult to evaluate. By examining the satisfaction and value of 
specific cyber visualization variable the perceived effectiveness of the system can be 
determined (Doll, Xai, & Torkzadeh, 1994). For this study, IS effectiveness was 
measured by obtaining user value and satisfaction (Levy, 2006). The survey in Appendix 
I was administered to SMEs to obtain ratings for satisfaction and value of the developed 
cyber visualization prototype. The survey consisted of a seven-point Likert scale 
assessing each cyber visualization variables and the visualization methods utilized in the 
final version of QUICK.v™. The survey was administered to SMEs using the online tool, 
survey monkey.  
Expert Panel 
An expert is a person qualified to address subjects from a relevant discipline 
(Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). To determine the relevant cyber visualization variables, SME 
input was obtained using the Delphi method. Based on the input obtained from the SMEs 
over multiple iterations of data collection, a user-centered design process was followed 
for the development of QUICK.v™. Capturing expert knowledge can be difficult but it is 
important for applying their experiences to a domain problem (Okesola, Ogunseye, & 
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Folorunso, 2010). Cyber SMEs tend to be extremely busy and obtaining their time can be 
very difficult (McKenna et al., 2015). In order to optimize the time obtained from cyber 
SMEs and get the most reliable consensus from the group the Delphi method was utilized 
(Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). Additionally, for this reason the Delphi method has been used 
extensively within past research (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014; Rowe & Wright, 1999; 
Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The Delphi method consisted of posing questions 
to the SMEs that are all centered on a central problem (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963).  
For the purpose of this study, all questions were focused on the problem of 
detecting potentially malicious cyber insider threats. Prior to data collection, at least 30 
SMEs in the cybersecurity or visualization industry was solicited for participation. SMEs 
with a background in cybersecurity was recruited from industry and consulting agencies. 
Since feedback was needed from the same SMEs once the prototype is completed, an 
experienced focus group of SMEs was sought to ensure they are still available for the 
prototype evaluation. SMEs were offered an incentive for their participation upon 
completion of phase three. Gray and Hovav (2014) denote the advantages of the Delphi 
method included:   
• Maintaining focus on the issue 
• Providing a framework for individuals to work 
• Minimizing participants tendencies to agree with the leader  
• Providing equal opportunity for input 
• Providing documented output (p. 343) 
Sun et al., (2006) as well as Ramim, Lichvar (2014) utilized Delphi techniques, as it was 
beneficial for obtaining consensus among SMEs on a particular topic. Thus, the Delphi 
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technique was used when obtaining the cyber visualization variables and rank order for 
the development of the visualization prototype. 
 
Reliability and Validity 
To prove that the developed instrument measures what it was intended to, the 
validity was pertinent to the research process (Straub, 1989). In this study data analysis 
needs to be conducted on three sets of data. The first point of data collection was 
obtained during phase one, based on the initial SME surveys the cyber visualization 
variables that were used to develop the prototype was determined. Then the identified 
cyber visualization variables were correlated to a practical visualization technique, used 
to depict the most simplified and understandable display of the complex data correlations. 
The second point of data collection was obtained within phase two, in which applicable 
visualization techniques were identified to display each vital sign. The visualization 
techniques were presented within a preliminary prototype to the SMEs for validation. The 
third point of data collection was once the prototype was developed to identify the 
perceived effectiveness of the prototype by validating the SMEs satisfaction and value 
pertaining to the cyber visualization variables and visualization techniques used within 
the developed prototype.  
Reliability 
The cyber visualization prototype was developed to enhance the presentation of 
complex data correlations when mitigating malicious insiders cyber threat. Surveys were 
administered to SMEs using the Delphi method. Since respondents can be inconsistent or 
unmotivated reliability may become an issue, which this study addressed (St. Louis, 
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Lubker, Yaruss, & Aliveto, 2009). SMEs were incentivized for participation, motivating 
them to continue throughout each phase of this study. The reliability of QUICK.v™ is 
determined based on the extent to which the developed product is without bias (Sekaran 
& Bougie, 2009). By utilizing an accepted consensus building process like the Delphi 
Method to obtain SME input, the reliability of this study was established (Ellis & Levy, 
2010). Particular attention was also paid to variations in answers from the SMEs, since 
misunderstanding the questions could lead to measurement errors or irrelevant 
requirements (Straub, 1989). 
Validity 
An instrument may be invalid based on the measurement items content (Straub, 
1989). Threats to internal validity include selection bias and statistical regression 
contamination. A threat to external validity is population validity (Sekaran & Bougie, 
2009). Population validity refers to generalizing research findings from a subset of a 
population as applicable to the entire population. If the sample has not been randomly 
selected from an accessible population, the experimenter cannot generalize to a larger 
group of participants, the relationship between the treatment variable and the 
characteristics of the target population helped determine if experimenter can generalize to 
the target population (Bracht & Glass, 1968). If the members of an experiment are 
selected randomly the potential problem of statistical regression contaminating the 
experiment will not occur (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Thoroughly defining the target 
population and selecting the accessible population by ensuring that similar characteristics 
apply within both populations may reduce the potential for population validity bias 
(Bracht & Glass, 1968). 
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When conducting the experiments there is potential for selection bias to occur 
since the members of the participant groups needed to have a particular skill set within 
cybersecurity. The potential for selection bias was mitigated by randomly selecting 
participants from a pool of qualified participants. There was reason to assume that 
participants selected for the experiment are different from other employees within an 
organization, since particular cyber professionals were sought (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). 
Having a person who is not specifically aware of the methods being tested select the 
participants for the experiment may control the potential for selection bias. Blackwell and 
Hodges (1957) states that selection bias may be eliminated by conducting the experiment 
in a way that the person involved in selecting the participants is not aware of the 
treatment methods.  
The potential for experimental mortality is also a potential threat to the validity of 
this study. Mortality refers to the loss of participants throughout the study, which may 
increase the difficulty of comparing the data collected across each group of participants 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Since there were three phases requiring participant input, 
there is an increased likelihood that participants may withdraw from the study. The 
potential threat to participant withdrawal from the study was addressed by incentivizing 
participants to partake within each phase of the study. The validity and reliability of the 
developed prototype is pertinent to the overall study, thus, mitigation steps were taken 
throughout this study to reduce potential threats. Taking potential threats into 
consideration and using validated methods during the research design and development 
may reduce threats to validity and reliability (Ellis & Levy, 2010).  
Prototype Perceived Effectiveness 
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Once QUICK.v™ has been developed the effectiveness was determined. In phase 
one, cyber visualization variables were obtained from at least 30 SMEs. Then in phase 
two the applied visualization techniques were validated using at least 30 SMEs. SME 
level of satisfaction and the value pertaining to the identified cyber visualization variables 
and applied visualization techniques were measured in phase three. Identifying the 
applicability of the cyber visualization variables within the final visualization was 
pertinent for potentially standardizing cybersecurity visualization vital signs. Rating the 
measure of value was deemed more beneficial than ranking characteristics, as this allows 
participants to denote characteristics of equal value if one did not out weight the other 
(Levy, 2004).  
The System Usability Scale (SUS) is one of the most widely used questionnaires 
to measure perceived usability or user satisfaction (Lewis & Sauro, 2009). SUS allows 
usability practitioners to quickly and easily assess the usability of a given product or 
service (Bangor, Kortum, & Miller, 2008). However, SUS was designed to form a 
unidimensional measure of perceived usability (Borsci, Federici, Bacci, Gnaldi, & 
Bartolucci, 2015). Sauro (2015) used SUS to measure the convergent validity of user 
experiences on over 100 websites. Though some have found SUS to be a bidimensional 
measure, it has been focused on usability and learnability (Borsci et al., 2015). Lewis and 
Sauro (2017) performed an analysis of over 9,000 reports that utilized SUS, and found 
that the bidimensional measure of SUS was not useful. Thus, while SUS has been found 
to be an effective measure of usability or user satisfaction this measure primarily focuses 
on user satisfaction and negates the evaluation of cognitive value or level of importance 
when determining perceived effectiveness. Levy (2006) denoted that the complete 
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measurement of IS effectiveness must include measures of the causal factors or ‘values’ 
as well as the end result construct or ‘user satisfaction’ (p. 60). As a result this study 
determined perceived effectiveness using the effectiveness grid that denotes the 
effectiveness curves and the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid (Levy, 2006).  
Since SUS does not measure value and satisfaction only statements from SUS was 
also applied within this study. Bangor et al. (2008) identified that 90% of SUS statements 
when utilized have been modified to compare and better understand their data since the 
scores from the utilized SUS statements provide a baseline score of usability. 
Consequentially, Bangor et al. (2008) validated the use of modified SUS statements in 
studies over several years, and found that modifications to SUS provide an adjective 
rating that correlates with a given score, and provides details of what constitutes as an 
acceptable SUS score. For the purpose of this study, the SUS statements depicted in 
Table 8 was modified and utilized in Appendix C.  
Table 8 
Modified SUS Statements 
Original SUS Statements Modified SUS Statements 
I thought the system was easy to use Ease of use of information depicted 
I found that the various functions in this 
system were well integrated 
Various variables were well integrated 
I found the system unnecessarily complex Complexity based on variables presented 
I felt very confident using the system Confidence quickly deciphering potential 
insider threats 
I thought that there was too much 
inconsistency in this system 
Consistency of visualizations presented 
 
The perceived effectiveness of the prototype was determined using a combination 
of value and satisfaction in order to indicate the magnitude of the prototype effectiveness 
(Levy, 2006; Dooley, Hackney, Dooley, Levy, & Parrish, 2015; Levy, Hackney, & 
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Parrish, 2017). By allowing SMEs to evaluate the final product SMEs can denote the 
perceived effectiveness and potential value of QUICK.v™. The feedback and results 
were analyzed to determine the viability of QUICK.v™ and suggested features for future 
iterations. 
 
Population and Sample 
 The study evaluated cyber visualization variables presented by at least 30 cyber 
analysts that were used to develop QUICK.v™. The unit of analysis for this study was 
the individual cyber analysts. The selected group of SMEs may also include cyber 
analytics as well as cyber forensics professionals. These SMEs were solicited specifically 
as the sample population for this study. A non-probability purposive judgment sampling 
method was applied. Professionals whom are willing to participate in the data collection 
were utilized to perform this study. Judgment sampling would be best applied to this 
research since individuals with knowledge or experience within cybersecurity and have 
utilized analytics tools may be in the best position to provide the information sought. This 
is a viable sampling method when there is only a small subset of people who possess the 
information needed to perform the research (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Cyber, cyber 
analytics, and cyber forensics professionals would be best suited for this study since they 
are more likely to be familiar with the threats malicious insiders pose, the analytics tools 
available and the difficulties faced when accurately detecting malicious activities within 
cybersecurity. A small subset of highly skilled individuals will have the identified skill 
set (Evans & Reeder, 2010).  
Data Collection 
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Data collection was conducted using a series of three instruments. In phase one, 
data collection consisted of a qualitative survey instrument, to identify the critical cyber 
visualization variables (Appendix A). In phase two, data collection consisted of a 
qualitative survey instrument, to identify the criteria for visualization design (Appendix 
B). Lastly, in phase three data was collected using a quantitative survey instrument, to 
identify the perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™ (Appendix C). Since data collection, 
analysis, and result reporting go hand in hand, accuracy of data collection was pertinent 
(Elo, Kaariainen, Kanste, Polkki, Utriainen, & Kyngas, 2014). To ensure accurate data is 
collected and that there are no missing or extreme data values pre-analysis data screening 
was performed (Mertler, & Vannatta 2005). This aided in ensuring accuracy when the 
data analysis is actually performed. Data collection was preformed on a sample of 
identified cybersecurity and visualization SMEs within a controlled environment. A 
controlled environment was utilized to allow for transcription during the data collection 
process. 
Data Analysis 
 Analysis results were applied to the development of QUICK.v™. Data collection 
was based on both literature and input from at least 20 SMEs. This study seeks to answer 
research question one and research question two by using SME input. Research question 
three was answered using literature review and research question four was answered 
using a combination of both SEM input as well as literature review. Research question 
five was also answered based on SME provided input. Qualitative data analysis was also 
utilized on the dataset in phase one and two. Qualitative and quantitative data analysis 
was performed on this data set in phase three to obtain the rated effectiveness and 
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feedback in relation to each rating. Since the development of QUICK.v™ was dependent 
upon the cyber visualization variables identified by the SMEs. The visualization 
techniques used to develop QUICK.v™ are the moderating variables for the developed 
display. For phase one, qualitative data analysis-using coding was applied to identify the 
cyber visualization variables based on the SME surveys. For phase two, statistical data 
analysis was also conducted to determine the relevant visualization techniques by 
identifying the relevant means. 
In phase three the perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™ was quantified based on 
research analysis. The perceived effectiveness was determined using the effectiveness 
grid that denotes the effectiveness curves and the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid 
(Levy, 2006). Within the effectiveness grid the mean satisfaction scores are on the 
horizontal axis while the mean value scores are on the vertical axis (see Figure 10). Based 
on Levy (2006) the calculation of satisfaction was performed by determining the mean 
satisfaction characteristic: 𝑆!!, … 𝑆!!!,  𝑆!!, 𝑆!!,  𝑆!!, 𝑆!!. The equation that was used to 
compute the mean satisfaction is:  
𝑆!! = 𝐴!_!"#!!!! !
!/!
 
Here, 𝐴!_!"# is the satisfaction score rated by SME 𝑖 for cyber visualization variable 𝐴!, 
and 𝑛 the number of cases that the data was collected. The aggregated value score noted 
as 𝑉!!,…𝑉!!!,  𝑉!!,…𝑉!!,  𝑉!!,…𝑉!!. The equation the was used to calculate the mean 
value is:  
𝑉!! = 𝐴!_!"#!!!! !
!/!
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The 𝐴!_!"# is the characteristic value score rated by SME 𝑖 for cyber visualization 
variable 𝐴!, and 𝑛 the number of cases that the data was collected (p. 184-185). Levy 
(2006) developed the learners value and satisfaction (LeVIS) index in order to indicate 
the perceived effectiveness of e-learning systems. The LeVIS index provides an overall 
score of the magnitude of effectiveness for the developed prototype. Thus, this study 
calculated the perceived effectiveness using the LeVIS index. Based on the LeVIS index 
the perceived effectiveness would be determined using the formula below. 1𝑛 ∗  𝑉! ∗ 𝑆!   →   0 ≤ 𝐿𝑒𝑉𝐼𝑆 ≤ 1 
 
 
Figure 10: Effectiveness Curves & Grid  
(Levy, 2006) 
 
Pre-analysis data screening was performed on the data collected prior to fully 
analyzing the data. Pre-analysis data screening was performed to prevent data collection 
issues (Levy & Ellis, 2006). The perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™ was dependent 
upon the SMEs ratings of satisfaction and importance. Multiple regression analysis may 
be used for data analysis. Multiple regression analysis is widely used because of its 
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applicability, robustness as well as ease of interpretation and may provide a baseline for 
evaluating empirical results (Mason, & Perreault, 1991). 
An additional level of analysis was performed on QUICK.v™ to assess the 
usability. The modified SUS statements utilized in Appendix C was extracted for 
evaluation, based on the adjective rating that correlates with a given score, and correlated 
to an acceptable SUS score. The SMEs satisfaction rating for each item was isolated for 
this analysis. Each score was mapped to a mean rating and quartile. A SUS score of 70 or 
above was deemed as acceptable (Bangor et al., 2008). As depicted in Table 9 each 
adjective from Appendix C is mapped to a mean quartile. Once the rating is obtained 
from SMEs the SUS score and acceptability can be determined as outlined in Figure 11. 
Table 9 
Mapping Adjective Rating to Study Mean Quartiles 
No. Adjective M Upper 
Bound 
Quartile 
7 Extremely Satisfied 100 100 4 
6 Very Satisfied 85.58 87.5 3 
5 Satisfied 72.75 75.0 2 
 
 
Mapping Adjective Rating to Study Mean Quartiles (continued) 
No. Adjective M Upper Bound Quartile 
4 Neutral 52.01 55.0 1 
3 Unsatisfied 39.17   
2 Very Unsatisfied NA   
1 Extremely Unsatisfied 25   
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Note. NA= Not applicable 
 
Figure 11: SUS Score by Quartile, Adjective Rating, and 
Acceptability (Bangor et al., 2008) 
 
Resources 
This study may require Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval since human 
participants was involved when testing the developed prototypes. Cybersecurity and 
visualization SMEs need to be obtained for applying the Delphi method for SME input. 
An HTML5 developer was utilized to develop the final prototype which required a 
website and hosting to allow easy access from the web. In addition this study also 
required obtaining parsed feeds of simulated data sets, this was housed in an AWS 
database. Access to a mobile device or computer was needed for presenting the 
developed visualization. Finally, ten $10 gift cards were needed to provide to the SMEs 
as a reward for their contributions to this study. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter an overview of the research methodology utilized for this study 
was provided.  This study used a mixed methods approach, thus, quantitative and 
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qualitative data was incorporated to develop, validate, and test the perceived 
effectiveness of a newly designed prototype that aided in identifying anomalous activities 
of malicious cyber insiders. The research questions that was addressed are: 
1. What are SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that should 
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious 
insider cyber threats?   
2. What is the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization 
variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat 
dashboard visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber 
insider activities? 
3. What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present 
complex cyber data correlations relevant to the predesignated critical 
cyber visualization variables that are applied within the developed cyber 
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?   
4. What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present 
top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially malicious 
cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber 
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?  
5. What is the SMEs’ perceived effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction & 
value/importance) of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating 
potentially malicious cyber insider threats? 
To address the research questions, the research methodology was applied over 
three phases. In phase one, an exploratory study was performed to identify the criteria 
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needed for displaying complex data correlations and visualization techniques extensive 
literature analysis is required for the foundation of the research. In phase two, an 
experimental study was performed to identify the criteria or user requirements for the 
visualization design. In phase three, qualitative data analysis was performed on data 
collected via an experiment to determine the perceived effectiveness or usability of the 
developed prototype. Obtaining a SUS score also provided a very useful metric for the 
overall prototype usability (Bangor et al., 2008).  Survey instruments were utilized in 
each phase to obtain applicable data, which was applied to the developed prototype. A 
survey instrument was developed to identify the cyber visualization variables SMEs. A 
qualitative survey instrument was developed to identify the visualization techniques for 
the identified cyber visualization variables obtained from instrument one.  
A prototype was developed based on the results of the data obtained from both 
instruments. Lastly, an instrument was utilized to determine the perceived effectiveness 
of the develop prototype. The population samples consisted of cybersecurity and 
visualization SMEs. The chapter concluded with an overview of the resources that were 
utilized in completing this experimental study. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Overview 
 Upon completion of the data collection process the methods of statistical analysis 
and the data analysis process utilized are included in this chapter. In phase one, the 
results are presented based on the data collection using SMEs and applying the Delphi 
Method to identify and rank the most critical cyber visualization variables. Then, the 
results from phase one are presented. In phase two, data collection is performed using 
SMEs by applying the Delphi Method to validate the identified visualization techniques 
and the techniques most valid for presenting complex cyber data. In phase three, the data 
analysis and process used to determine the perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™ was 
completed. Based on data collection performed using SMEs, the identified value and 
satisfaction for the developed prototype QUICK.v™ was attained. Presented at the end of 
this chapter is the summary of the results for all three phases. 
 
Phase One - Expert Panel 
 Initial data collection compromised of data collected from cybersecurity SMEs. 
For phase one of this study, using the Delphi Method data collection was conducted early 
January 2018 to late February 2018. The following sections present the data collection 
process for phase one.  
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Phase One – Data Collection 
 For phase one of this study, the goal for the SMEs was to identify the critical 
cyber visualization variables that should be displayed when using applications to detect 
potentially malicious insider cyber threats. Prior to the initial survey a pilot was 
performed with five SMEs to verify the reliability of the data. Pilot studies are important 
for trying out the research instrument as this could identify points where the proposed 
instrument may be complicated or fail (Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). The survey was 
then refined and the final instrument used for phase one is presented in Appendix E. The 
SMEs consisted of 300 cybersecurity professionals. These individuals were sourced from 
LinkedIn social network. They included individuals in academia, public, and private 
sector companies. Individuals in this group were located in the U.S., Europe, and India. 
These individuals were selected as described in chapter three. An email presented in 
Appendix D containing a link to a Web-based survey tool was used to record the 
responses of the SMEs. A total of 42 SMEs completed the phase one survey. Upon 
completing the survey another round of data collection for the identified variables was 
performed with eight SMEs, additional qualitative data was captured in relation to each 
variable and their selections. 
Phase One – Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
 Prior to data analysis pre-analysis data screening was performed on the data 
collected from the SMEs. As noted by Mertler and Vannatta (2005), to ensure accurate 
data is collected and that there are no missing or extreme data values pre-analysis data 
screening needs to be performed. Levy and Ellis (2006) also denoted pre-analysis data 
screening needs to be performed to prevent data collection issues. SME responses were 
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collected using the Web-based tool SurveyMonkey®, which technically ensure 
completeness by impeding impartial survey submissions. As a result, none of the surveys 
submitted were excluded. Upon performing pre-analysis data screening no outliers were 
identified or excluded, thus, all 42 responses collected were complete and included in the 
data analysis. 
Phase One - Expert Panel Characteristics 
 For phase one, the SMEs were solicited from LinkedIn professional contacts. A 
survey was then distributed via email to collect responses. A total of 42 SMEs responded 
by completing survey instrument one. This survey consisted of questions concerning the 
identification of potentially malicious cyber insiders by identifying relevant cyber 
visualization variables. Respondents were then asked to identify relevant demographic 
information. Demographic information requested from the SMEs included gender and 
age. To identify the expertise level of the SMEs they were asked to identify the number 
of professional certifications they currently hold between zero and five or more 
certifications. The level of education of the SMEs was also identified. SMEs were to 
identify themselves as holding a 2-year college (Associates degree), a 4-year college 
(Bachelors degree), a Graduate degree, or a Doctorate.  
 SMEs were also asked to identify their experience within their current roles based 
on the number of years they have worked within their current organizations. They were 
able to select from under one year, one to five years, six to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 to 
20 years, and over 30 years. SMEs were to identify themselves as working within 
academia, federal government, private sector, sate government, or other. SMEs were 
asked to identify their job function within cybersecurity. Finally, the SMEs were asked to 
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describe their current employer by identifying which role described their current 
employer. Table 10 represents the complete SME demographic distributions based on 
their responses. 
Table 10 
Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (N= 42) 
    Frequency 
Percentage 
(%) 
Gender       
  Female 4 9.5% 
  Male 38 90.5% 
Age 
Category       
  20-29 11 26.2% 
  30-39 13 31.0% 
  40-49 13 31.0% 
  50-59 5 11.9% 
Certification       
  0 17 40.5% 
  1 9 21.4% 
  2 3 7.1% 
  3 4 9.5% 
  4 3 7.1% 
  5 or more 6 14.3% 
Education       
  2-year college (Associates degree) 1 2.4% 
  4-year college (Bachelors degree) 18 42.9% 
  Graduate degree 19 45.2% 
  Doctorate 4 9.5% 
Experience       
  Under 1 year 7 20.0% 
  1 - 5 years 23 65.7% 
  6 - 10 years 6 17.1% 
  11 - 15 years 2 5.7% 
  16 - 20 years 3 8.6% 
  Over 30 years 1 2.9% 
Employer       
  Academia 5 11.9% 
  Federal government employee 4 9.5% 
  Private sector company 29 69.0% 
  State government employee 1 2.4% 
  Other  3 7.1% 
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Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (continued) 
  Frequency 
Percentage 
(%) 
Job Function       
  Cybersecurity Administrator 1 2.4% 
  Cybersecurity Analyst 1 2.4% 
  Cybersecurity Architect 2 4.8% 
  Cybersecurity Consultant 15 35.7% 
  Cybersecurity Engineer 4 9.5% 
  Information Assurance Engineer 1 2.4% 
  Information Security Analyst 1 2.4% 
  Information Security Manager 4 9.5% 
  Network Security Engineer 1 2.4% 
  Other  12 28.6% 
 
Phase One – Data Analysis 
 In phase one, the data collected was exported to Microsoft Excel for initial 
analysis. Answers to each survey question were parsed to identify the count of each 
variable selected by the SMEs. In survey one the variables within each individual 
category were first assessed by the SMEs. To address RQ1, what are SMEs' identified 
critical cyber visualization variables that should be displayed when using applications to 
detect potentially malicious insider cyber threats? SMEs were asked to select the relevant 
analytic variable within each identified category that they deem to be most important 
when trying to identify potentially malicious insider threats. The categories of analytic 
variables individually assessed include: System, Social, Health, Human Resources, 
Financial, Security, and Criminal.   
 Since the SMEs were asked to select at most two analytic variables for each 
category, the variables were weighted based on their selection for analysis. If the SME 
did not deem a variable as critical, they did not have to select a variable within that 
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category. Thus, some variables were not selected and had a count of zero. The count or 
number of responses pertaining to the particular variable represents the total instances 
that an analytic variable was selected as a response for variable one and variable two 
within each category. If the variable was selected as variable one or variable two, this 
selection was then weighted to obtain the weighted average ranking for that variable. The 
total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of the 42 
participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. The weighted average 
ranking was then converted to a percentage to represent the final ranking of the 
applicable variable within its category. For instance, in Table 11 for the analytic variable 
‘access inconsistent with user class’, the count of SME selection for variable one was 
eight, while the count for variable two was also eight, resulting in a total ‘Count’ of 
sixteen. The eight selections for variable one and two were subsequently weighted, with 
variable one being given a higher weight than variable two. The weighted average 
ranking for the variable was then determined by using the weight of ranked position (w), 
multiplied by the response count (x), as depicted in the formula below.  𝑥!𝑤! + 𝑥!𝑤!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  
 Once the weighted average ranking for all variables within the category was determined, 
the applicable percentage for that raking in relation to all variables were determined. This 
was performed for each variable within the category. Subsequently, the same steps were 
performed for each individual analytic variable category. 
 In this study, system analytic variables refer to system generated events based on 
event logs. System event logs generally portray system, user, and network activity. These 
logs are generated by the server operating system, firewall, or other applications within 
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an organizations environment (Girardin & Brodbeck, 1998). Audit logs contain a detailed 
trace of an operating system (Yoo, Jo, Kim, & Seo, 2018). From these logs observations 
relevant to user behavior can be made. The system analytic variables below reflect types 
of observations a cybersecurity analyst can make based on the event logs. Table 11 
represents the final weight allocation for the system analytic variables based on SME 
responses. 
Table 11 
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant System Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42) 
System - Analytic Variables Count % 
Access Inconsistent With User Class 16 19% 
Changes in Data Access Patterns 12 16% 
Privilege Change 10 14% 
Authentication and Authorization Failure 9 14% 
Data Exfiltration 7 12% 
Unauthorized Data Access Methods 13 8% 
Audit Log Modification 6 7% 
Knowledge Access 2 4% 
Network Patterns Inconsistent with User Class 4 3% 
Improper Command Usage 1 2% 
Changes in Network Patterns 1 1% 
Erroneous Defensive Posture Changes 0 0% 
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of 
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. 
 
 In this study, facility analytic variables refer to event logs generated in relation to 
aspects of physical access. The times that a user enters or leaves a facility. This data is 
generally logged and monitored. Using logs that show physical movement via the system 
access control systems can aid in the detection of malicious insiders (Sanders, 2017). 
Access times and locations are vital to protecting cybersecurity systems within an 
organization (Denning & MacDoran, 1996). The facility analytic variables below reflect 
types of observations a cybersecurity analyst can make based on these event logs. Table 
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12 represents the final weight allocation for the facility analytic variables based on SME 
responses. 
Table 12 
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Facility Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42) 
Facility - Analytic Variables Count % 
Time of Access Pattern Changes 39 71% 
Locality of Access Pattern Changes 41 29% 
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of 
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. 
 
 In this study, the business capability analytic variables refer to aspects of an 
organizations business model that define their business capabilities. Business capabilities 
are generally focused on people, process, and technology within the organization 
Rosemann & vom Brocke, 2015). By integrating, monitoring and analyzing a vast 
amount of dispersed event logs organizations can monitor and analyze the performance of 
their business processes (Vera-Baquero, Colomo Palacios, Stantchev, & Molloy, 2015). 
The business capability analytic variables below reflect types of observations a 
cybersecurity analyst can make based on relevant business capability events. Table 13 
represents the final weight allocation for the business capability analytic variables based 
on SME responses. 
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Table 13 
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Business Capability Analytic Variables Selected 
(N= 42) 
Business Capability - Analytic Variables Count % 
Malware Deployment 16 35% 
Failure Correlation 11 24% 
Attribution of Disclosure 5 18% 
Analysis of Competitor 4 12% 
Retrieval 8 8% 
Analysis of Public Media 3 3% 
Deletion or Modification of Data or Infrastructure 0 0% 
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of 
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. 
 
 In this study, the social analytic variables refer to aspects of a users behavior or 
relevant human factors. Negative attitudes toward business activities and impulsivity can 
be correlated with risky cybersecurity behaviors (Hadlington, 2017). Monitoring human 
factors in cybersecurity is important, if ignored these factors can place an organization at 
risk. Since social analytic variables does not generally have data available within event 
logs or SIEM solutions. This data may be identified using dictionary languages with 
theme-specific dictionaries that contain a list of words that have been validated to be 
associated with constructs. These constructs may include wellbeing, engagement, positive 
and negative emotion, power, etc. In the future this data may be collected from employee 
email, social media, or instant messenger content (Shami, Muller, Pal, Masli, & Geyer, 
2015). The social analytic variables below reflect types of observations a cybersecurity 
analyst can make based on relevant social events. Table 14 represents the final weight 
allocation for the social analytic variables based on SME responses. 
Table 14 
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Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Social Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42) 
Social - Analytic Variables Count % 
Unauthorized or Inappropriate Associations 23 37% 
Personal Inflexibility 7 12% 
Workplace Satisfaction 11 10% 
Disregard 6 10% 
Unusual Contacts 10 8% 
Unusual Business Travel 7 8% 
Unusual Personal Travel 3 7% 
Withdrawal 8 5% 
Workplace Events 4 3% 
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of 
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. 
 
 In this study, the health analytic variables refer to aspects of a users behavior or 
relevant human factors. Human factors contribute to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
risks (Hadlington, 2017).  Instability and impulsivity can impact a users tendency toward 
malicious activities (King, Henshel, Flora, Cains, Hoffman, & Sample, 2018). The health 
analytic variables below reflect types of observations a cybersecurity analyst can make 
based on relevant health events. Table 15 represents the final weight allocation for the 
health analytic variables based on SME responses. 
Table 15 
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Health Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42) 
Health - Analytic Variables Count % 
Mental instability 40 62% 
Impulse Control 43 38% 
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of 
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. 
 
 In this study, the human resource analytic variables refer to events obtained via 
human resources (HR). Generally, HR representatives track and monitor complaints or 
review data pertaining to a user. Human characteristics can be correlated with 
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cybersecurity behaviors, this data can be utilized to identify cybersecurity events 
(Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, & Ginther, 2018). The HR analytic variables below 
reflect types of observations that can be made based on relevant HR events. Table 16 
represents the final weight allocation for the health analytic variables based on SME 
responses. 
Table 16 
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Human Resource Analytic Variables Selected 
(N= 42) 
Human Resources - Analytic Variables Count % 
Complaints Against the User 37 45% 
Major Life Event 18 31% 
Negative Reviews 27 24% 
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of 
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. 
 
 In this study, the financial analytic variables refer to events related to a users 
financial means. A users financial means or changes to those means can affect users 
cybersecurity related activities. With changes in means a user can generally be tied to 
fraudulent insider activities (Westerlund, Craigen, Bailetti, & Agwae, 2018). The 
financial analytic variables below reflect types of observations that can be made based on 
relevant financial events. Table 17 represents the final weight allocation for the financial 
analytic variables based on SME responses. 
 
 
 
 
         
 
103
Table 17 
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Financial Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42) 
Financial - Analytic Variables Count % 
Observed Change in Means Relative to Peers 25 36% 
Observed Temporal Change in Means 26 33% 
Financial Reporting 28 31% 
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of 
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. 
 
 In this study, the security analytic variables refer to user activities that trigger 
security related events. Security analytic variables are generally identified using event 
logs. An organization may identify specific triggers for what constitutes a security event. 
For the purpose of this study examples of security events may include: software 
installation, managing system services, or successful and failed login attempts (Malec, 
Piwowar, Kozakiewicz, & Lasota, 2015). The security analytic variables below reflect 
types of observations that can be made based on relevant security events. Table 18 
represents the final weight allocation for the security analytic variables based on SME 
responses. 
Table 18 
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Security Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42) 
Security - Analytic Variables Count % 
Unauthorized or Inappropriate Use of Tools 33 58% 
Duration and Regularity of Security Events 23 27% 
Change in Violation Patterns 23 15% 
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of 
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. 
 
 In this study, the criminal analytic variables refer to events related to a users 
criminal activity. Criminal activities may contribute to a users cybersecurity related 
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activities. (Chang, Zhong, & Grabosky, 2018). The criminal analytic variables below 
reflect types of observations that can be made based on relevant criminal events. Table 19 
represents the final weight allocation for the criminal analytic variables based on SME 
responses. 
Table 19 
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Criminal Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42) 
Criminal - Analytic Variables Count % 
Recent Increase in Criminal Events 28 40% 
Violence Outside Workplace 25 25% 
Wage Garnishments 15 25% 
Restraining Orders 9 10% 
 Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of 
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. 
 
Critical Cyber Visualization Variables Rank Order 
 Research question two asked: what is the rank order of the SMEs' identified 
critical cyber visualization variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber 
insider threat dashboard visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber 
insider activities? To address it, in survey instrument one, SMEs were presented with all 
45 analytic variables. They were then asked to think of issues related to the insider threat 
detection and list only the top five variables that are the most important to them when 
identifying malicious insider threats. From the SMEs weighted rankings the identified top 
six critical cyber visualization variables were: workplace satisfaction, change in violation 
patterns, audit log modification, change in data access patterns, data exfiltration, and 
privilege change. Table 20 presents the resulting rank order for all critical cyber 
visualization variables based on SME responses. 
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Table 20 
Final Weighted Rankings for all Analytic Variables Selected as the Top Five Most 
Critical When Identifying Potentially Malicious Insider Threats 
Analytic Variables 
Weighted 
Mean 
Final 
Rank 
Social-Workplace Satisfaction 4.00 1 
Security-Change in Violation Patterns 4.00 1 
System-Audit Log Modification 3.82 3 
System-Changes in Data Access Patterns 3.80 4 
System-Data Exfiltration 3.70 5 
System-Privilege Change 3.69 6 
Business Capabilities-Malware Deployment 3.60 7 
Human Resources-Negative Reviews 3.60 7 
System-Authentication and Authorization Failure 3.45 9 
System-Unauthorized Data Access Methods 3.36 10 
Facility-Time of Access Pattern Changes 3.29 11 
Facility-Locality of Access Pattern Changes 3.00 12 
Criminal-Recent Increase in Criminal Events 3.00 12 
System-Access Inconsistent With User Class 2.78 14 
Criminal-Violence Outside Workplace 2.67 15 
System-Changes in Network Patterns 2.50 16 
Criminal-Wage Garnishments 2.40 17 
Human Resources-Complaints Against the User 2.25 18 
System-Knowledge Access 2.20 19 
Social-Unauthorized or Inappropriate Associations 2.17 20 
Business Capabilities-Deletion or Modification of Data 
or Infrastructure 2.10 21 
Business Capabilities-Failure Correlation 2.00 22 
Social-Disregard 2.00 22 
Social-Workplace Events 2.00 22 
Human Resources-Major Life Event 2.00 22 
Security-Duration and Regularity of Security Events 2.00 22 
System-Network Patterns Inconsistent with User Class 1.50 27 
Security-Unauthorized or Inappropriate Use of Tools 1.50 27 
Business Capabilities-Analysis of Public Media 1.00 29 
Social-Unusual Business Travel 1.00 29 
Social-Unusual Personal Travel 1.00 29 
Social-Withdrawal 1.00 29 
Criminal-Restraining Orders 1.00 29 
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Analytic Variable Final Weighted Rankings (continued) 
Analytic Variables 
Weighted 
Mean 
Final 
Rank 
System-Improper Command Usage 0.00 34 
System-Erroneous Defensive Posture Changes 0.00 34 
Business Capabilities-Attribution of Disclosure 0.00 34 
Business Capabilities-Analysis of Competitor 0.00 34 
Business Capabilities-Retrieval 0.00 34 
Social-Personal Inflexibility 0.00 34 
Social-Unusual Contacts 0.00 34 
Social-Mental instability 0.00 34 
Social-Impulse Control 0.00 34 
Human Resources-Observed Change in Means Relative 
to Peers 0.00 34 
Human Resources-Observed Temporal Change in Means 0.00 34 
Human Resources-Financial Reporting 0.00 34 
 
Phase One - Comments 
 No exclusions were identified within the 42 completed surveys. In survey 
instrument one, SMEs where asked to comment on the positives and negatives associated 
with their identified top five critical cyber visualization variables. Commenting was not 
required for these questions. The responses received were relatively consistent and 
general in nature. For the positives associated with the top five critical cyber visualization 
variables similar comments suggested the variables identified would: be a good indicator 
of a potential problem, allow for a quicker way to pin-point an issue, and assist with 
quicker resolutions to detected serious violations. The negatives associated with the top 
six critical cyber visualization variables identified by the SMEs suggested: identified 
violations based on the variables should be considered in context, false positives may 
persist as an issue, and that some data may be difficult for an employer to obtain. In 
addition to the comments within the survey the focus group was contacted for additional 
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validation of the data collected. Comments from the focus group aligned with the 
comments obtained within survey instrument one as a result no further additions or 
collection was needed.  
Phase Two - Expert Panel 
 Initial data collection compromised of data collected from cybersecurity and 
visualization SMEs. For phase two of this study, using the Delphi Method data collection 
was conducted mid-March 2018 to late March 2018. The following sections present the 
data collection process for phase two.  
Phase Two – Data Collection 
 For phase two of this study, the goal for the SMEs was to identify the 
visualization techniques that are most valid to present the top five critical cyber 
visualization variables. Also, to identify the visualization techniques that are most valid 
to present complex cyber data correlations. Prior to the initial survey, a pilot was 
performed with three SMEs to verify the survey’s ability to collect appropriate data. The 
survey was then refined and the final instrument used for phase two is presented in 
Appendix G. The SMEs consisted of 80 cybersecurity and visualization professionals, 
these individuals were sourced from the SME demographic information collected in 
phase one. SMEs with higher levels of expertise were invited to participate. Additional 
SMEs were added to the list from the initial 300 participants identified for phase one, 
based on certification and job function data on their LinkedIn profiles. The SMEs for 
phase two included individuals in academia, public, and private sector companies. 
Individuals in this group were located primarily in the U.S. An invitation was sent to each 
participant to complete the Google Forms® presented in Appendix F. A total of 31 SMEs 
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completed the survey in this round. Upon completing the survey another round of data 
collection for the identified variables was performed with six SMEs from the focus 
group, additional qualitative data was captured in relation to each variable and their 
selections. 
Phase Two – Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
 Prior to data analysis pre-analysis data screening was performed on the data 
collected from the SMEs. SME responses were collected using the Web-based tool 
Google Forms®, this tool allowed for technical restrictions to form submissions without 
completing all questions. This ensured completeness by impeding impartial survey 
submissions. As a result and given no missing data existed, none of the surveys submitted 
were excluded. Upon performing pre-analysis data screening no outliers were identified 
or excluded. The 31 responses collected were all included for data analysis.  
Phase Two - Expert Panel Characteristics 
 For phase two, the SMEs were solicited from the researches LinkedIn 
professional contacts. A survey was then distributed via email to collect responses. A 
total of 31 SMEs responded by completing survey instrument two. This survey consisted 
of questions concerning the identification of visualization techniques to present top five 
critical cyber visualization variables and to present complex cyber data correlations. 
Respondents were asked to identify relevant demographic information. Demographic 
information requested from the SMEs included gender and age. To identify the expertise 
level of the SMEs they were asked to identify the number of professional certifications 
they currently hold between zero to five or more certifications. The level of education of 
the SMEs was also identified. SMEs were to identify themselves as holding a 2-year 
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college (Associates degree), a 4-year college (Bachelors degree), a Graduate degree 
(MA/MS), or a Doctorate.  
 Additionally, SMEs were asked to identify their experience within their current 
roles based on the number of years they have worked within their current organizations. 
They were able to select from under one year, one to five years, six to 10 years, 11 to 15 
years, 16 to 20 years, and over 30 years. The SMEs were asked to describe their current 
employer by identifying which role described their current employer. They were to 
identify themselves as working within academia, federal government, private sector, sate 
government, or other. SMEs were asked to identify their job function within 
cybersecurity. Table 21 represents the demographic distribution of their responses. 
Table 21 
Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (N= 31) 
    Frequency % 
Gender       
  Female 6 19.4% 
  Male 25 80.6% 
Age Category       
  20-29 12 38.7% 
  30-39 10 32.3% 
  40-49 5 16.1% 
  50-59 4 12.9% 
Certification       
  0 9 29.0% 
  1 8 25.8% 
  2 6 19.4% 
  3 1 3.2% 
  4 1 3.2% 
  5 or more 6 19.4% 
Education       
  2-year college (Associates degree) 1 3.2% 
  4-year college (Bachelors degree) 18 58.1% 
  Graduate degree (MA/MS) 12 38.7% 
  Doctorate 0 0.0% 
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Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (continued)  
  Frequency % 
Experience       
  Under 1 year 10 47.6% 
  1 - 5 years 16 76.2% 
  6 - 10 years 1 4.8% 
  11 - 15 years 3 14.3% 
  16 - 20 years 0 0.0% 
  Over 30 years 1 4.8% 
Employer       
  Academia 5 16.1% 
  Federal government employee 2 6.5% 
  Private sector company 1 3.2% 
  State government employee 1 3.2% 
  Other  22 71.0% 
Job Function       
  Cybersecurity Administrator 1 3.2% 
  Cybersecurity Analyst 0 0.0% 
  Cybersecurity Architect 2 6.5% 
  Cybersecurity Consultant 14 45.2% 
  Cybersecurity Engineer 6 19.4% 
  Information Assurance Engineer 0 0.0% 
  Information Security Analyst 0 0.0% 
  Information Security Manager 4 12.9% 
  Network Security Engineer 0 0.0% 
  Other  4 12.9% 
 
Phase Two – Data Analysis 
 In phase two the data collected was converted to Excel for initial analysis, 
answers to each survey question were parsed to identify the count of each variable 
selected by the SMEs. The visualization technique for each of the SMEs' identified 
critical cyber visualization variable were first assessed. RQ3 asked: what SMEs’ 
identified visualization techniques are most valid to present complex cyber data 
correlations relevant to the pre-designated critical cyber visualization variables that are 
applied within the developed cyber visualization prototype QUICK.v™? To address 
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RQ3, SMEs were presented with three options of visualization techniques identified for 
presenting complex data correlations. They were then asked to select the visualization 
technique from the three options presented that are most relevant to displaying two or 
more data variables. RQ4 four asked: what SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are 
most valid to present top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially 
malicious cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber 
visualization prototype QUICK.v™? To address RQ4, SMEs were presented with three 
options of visualization techniques identified for presenting each of the six critical cyber 
visualization variables. Based on the data analysis results from phase one, since six 
critical cyber visualization variables were identified, survey two was modified to add six 
critical cyber visualization variables. SMEs were asked to select the visualization 
technique from the three options presented that are most relevant to displaying data 
related to each of the six critical cyber visualization variables. 
 Since the SMEs were asked to select one option for each visualization technique 
presented the responses were not weighted prior to determining the final allocations. All 
questions were also marked are requiring a response, as a result SMEs had to select a 
visualization technique for each of the critical cyber visualization variables. Table 22 
through Table 27 represent the final rankings for the present top six critical cyber 
visualization variables. Based on the count (n), the average for each visualization 
technique was identified. This was performed on all data collected for each of the six 
critical cyber visualization variables, allowing for the identification of which 
visualization techniques are most valid to present each of the top six critical cyber 
visualization variables.  
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Table 22 
Visualization Technique Rankings (N= 31) 
    N % 
Workplace 
Satisfaction 
  
  
      
Line Graph 16 52% 
Bar Graph 13 42% 
Calendar View 2 6% 
Change in 
Violation 
Pattern 
  
 
      
Area Chart 18 58% 
Radar Plot 9 29% 
Streamgraph 4 13% 
   
Audit Log 
Modification 
  
  
  
      
Line Graph 18 58% 
Fisheye Distortion 8 26% 
Bar Graph 5 16% 
   Change in 
Data Access 
Pattern 
  
  
  
      
Stacked Column Graph 18 58% 
Stacked Bar Graph 12 39% 
Streamgraph 1 3% 
   
Data 
Exfiltration 
   
Line Graph 18 58% 
Column Graph 9 29% 
Fisheye Distortion 4 13% 
Privilege 
Change 
   
Line Graph 16 52% 
Stacked Bars 14 45% 
Stacked Columns 1 3% 
Complex Data 
Correlations 
   
Parallel Coordinates 15 48% 
Chord Diagram 14 45% 
Hierarchical Bundling 2 6% 
 
Phase Two – Comments 
 No exclusions were identified within the 31 completed surveys. In survey 
instrument two, SMEs were not asked for comments. Since the identified list of SMEs 
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consisted of 80 individuals, using the Delphi method the initial set of surveys were sent to 
all 80 SMEs to complete on their own. Subsequently, survey instrument two was again 
administered to eight SMEs of the focus group using a contrived setting allowed for 
extensive control over the experiment. A virtual lab environment was used via Google 
Hangout to obtain qualitative data from these SMEs. Consistent responses were received. 
SMEs denoted though they were intrigued by the more creative visualization techniques 
presented, they veered towards selecting the more standard methods that they are used in 
other contexts and could easily make sense of. Another recurrent comment was, that 
SMEs are often presented with dashboards that make no sense to them and found this to 
be a good way to start standardization. All other comments were generally around data 
within the visualizations, to which SMEs’ were then asked, for this survey to bring their 
focus back on the visualization technique itself and not the data presented.  
 
Phase Three – Expert Panel 
 Initial data collection compromised of data collected from cybersecurity and 
visualization SMEs. For phase three of this study, data collection was conducted mid-
April 2018 to late April 2018. The following sections present the data collection process 
for phase three.  
Phase Three – Data Collection 
 In phase three of this study, the goal for the SMEs was to identify the perceived 
effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction & value/importance) of the developed prototype 
QUICK.v™. Prior to the initial survey a pilot was performed with five SMEs to verify 
the survey’s ability to collect appropriate data. The survey was then refined and the final 
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instrument used for phase three is presented in Appendix I. The SMEs in this phase 
consisted of 300 cybersecurity and visualization professionals. These individuals were 
sourced from LinkedIn network. They included individuals in academia, public, and 
private sector companies. Individuals in this group were located primarily in the U.S. and 
India. An invitation was sent to each participant to complete the Google Forms® 
presented in Appendix H. A total of 26 SMEs completed the survey.  
Phase Three – Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
 Prior to data analysis pre-analysis data screening was performed on the data 
collected from the SMEs. SME responses were collected using the Web-based tool 
Google Forms®, this tool allowed for technical restrictions to form submissions without 
completing all questions. This ensured completeness by impeding impartial survey 
submissions. Upon performing pre-analysis data screening, an outlier was identified and 
excluded from further analysis. No additional responses were excluded, thus from the 26 
responses collected, 25 were included for data analysis.  
Phase Three - Expert Panel Characteristics 
 For phase three, the SMEs were solicited from LinkedIn professional contacts. A 
survey was then distributed via email to collect responses. A total of 26 SMEs responded 
by completing survey instrument one was usable due to one outlier. This survey consisted 
of questions to identify the level of satisfaction and the value for each of the top six 
critical cyber visualization variables and presentation technique. Respondents were asked 
to identify relevant demographic information. Demographic information requested from 
the SMEs included gender and age. To identify the expertise level of the SMEs they were 
asked to identify the number of professional certifications they currently hold between 
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zero to five or more certifications. The level of education of the SMEs was also 
identified. SMEs were to identify themselves as holding a 2-year college (Associates 
degree), a 4-year college (Bachelors degree), a Graduate degree (MA/MS), or a 
Doctorate.  
 Additionally, SMEs were asked to identify their experience within their current 
roles based on the number of years they have worked within their current organizations. 
They were able to select from under one year, one to five years, six to 10 years, 11 to 15 
years, 16 to 20 years, and over 30 years. The SMEs were asked to describe their current 
employer by identifying which role described their current employer. They were to 
identify themselves as working within academia, federal government, private sector, sate 
government, or other. SMEs were asked to identify their job function within 
cybersecurity. Table 23 represents the demographic distribution of their responses. 
Table 23 
Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (N= 25) 
    Frequency % 
Gender       
  Female 4 16.0% 
  Male 21 84.0% 
Age Category       
  20-29 7 28.0% 
  30-39 11 44.0% 
  40-49 4 16.0% 
  50-59 3 12.0% 
Certification       
  0 9 36.0% 
  1 8 32.0% 
  2 3 12.0% 
  3 2 8.0% 
  4 1 4.0% 
  5 or more 2 8.0% 
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Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (continued) 
  Frequency % 
Education       
  2-year college (Associates degree) 2 8.0% 
  4-year college (Bachelors degree) 10 40.0% 
  Graduate degree (MA/MS) 11 44.0% 
  Doctorate 2 8.0% 
Experience       
  Under 1 year 3 13.6% 
  1 - 5 years 13 59.1% 
  6 - 10 years 3 13.6% 
  11 - 15 years 4 18.2% 
  16 - 20 years 2 9.1% 
  Over 30 years 0 0.0% 
Employer       
  Academia 7 28.0% 
  Federal government employee 4 16.0% 
  Private sector company 2 8.0% 
  State government employee 2 8.0% 
  Other  10 40.0% 
Job Function       
  Cybersecurity Administrator 0 0.0% 
  Cybersecurity Analyst 5 20.0% 
  Cybersecurity Architect 2 8.0% 
  Cybersecurity Consultant 6 24.0% 
  Cybersecurity Engineer 4 16.0% 
  Information Assurance Engineer 0 0.0% 
  Information Security Analyst 0 0.0% 
  Information Security Manager 2 8.0% 
  Network Security Engineer 0 0.0% 
  Other  6 24.0% 
 
Phase Three – Data Analysis 
 In phase three the data collected was exported to Microsoft Excel for initial 
analysis, answers to each survey question were parsed to identify the count of each 
variable selected by the SMEs. The demographic data was first assessed. Next, the 
descriptive analysis was prepared for the top six critical cyber visualization variables and 
the variable for complex data correlations. Table 24 represents the summary for the 
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calculated mean (M), percentage (%), and standard deviation (SD). Table 31 represents 
the summary for the calculated mean (M), percentage (%), and standard deviation (SD) 
for the value. 
 The level of satisfaction with variable one, workplace satisfaction had an average 
of 5.20 with a min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The level of satisfaction with variable two, 
change in violation patterns had an average of 4.92 with a min = 1.00 and max = 7.00. 
The level of satisfaction with variable three, audit log modification had an average of 
5.12 with a min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The level of satisfaction with variable four, 
changes in data access patterns had an average of 5.28 with a min = 1.00 and max = 7.00. 
The level of satisfaction with variable five, data exfiltration had an average of 5.40 with a 
min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The level of satisfaction with variable six, privilege change 
had an average of 5.60 with a min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The level of satisfaction with 
complex cyber data correlations had an average of 4.96 with a min = 1.00 and max = 
7.00.  
 The value of variable one, workplace satisfaction had an average of 5.92 with a 
min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The value of variable two, change in violation patterns had 
an average of 6.12 with a min = 3.00 and max = 7.00. The value of variable three, audit 
log modification had an average of 6.00 with a min = 3.00 and max = 7.00. The value of 
variable four, changes in data access patterns had an average of 6.48 with a min = 5.00 
and max = 7.00. The value of variable five, data exfiltration had an average of 6.52 with a 
min = 5.00 and max = 7.00. The value of variable six, privilege change had an average of 
6.24 with a min = 4.00 and max = 7.00. The value of complex cyber data correlations had 
an average of 6.16 with a min = 3.00 and max = 7.00. Table 24 represents the descriptive 
statistics for the critical cyber visualization variables. 
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Table 24 
Descriptive Statistics for Critical Cyber Visualization Variables (N=25) 
Item Satisfaction Value 
 M SD M SD 
Variable 1: Workplace 
Satisfaction 5.20 
 1.38 5.92 1.22 
Variable 2: Change in 
Violation Patterns 4.92 1.80 6.12 1.13 
Variable 3: Audit Log 
Modification 5.12
 1.39 6 1.08 
Variable 4: Changes in Data 
Access Patterns	 5.28	 1.62	 6.48	 0.77	
Variable 5: Data Exfiltration 5.40 1.58 6.52 0.71 
Variable 6: Privilege 
Change 5.60
 1.44 6.24 1.01 
 
 Then the data for the level of satisfaction and the value was analyzed in order to 
determine the respective perceived effectiveness. To address research question five, what 
is the SMEs’ perceived effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction & value/importance) of the 
QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating potentially malicious cyber insider threats? After 
viewing the developed prototype QUICK.v™ SMEs’ were presented a 7-point Likert-
type rating scale for satisfaction and value to assess for each stated item. Since the 
statements within survey instrument three were not positively or negatively termed the 
data was not reverse coded prior to analysis. The satisfaction and value/importance of 
each item was calculated to then determine the perceived effectiveness using the LeVIS 
index (Levy, 2006). Based on the LeVIS index the perceived effectiveness was 
determined using the formula below. Where 49 is used as n to normalize the effectiveness 
output. This is based on the maximum value and satisfaction scale being seven. Thus, 
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seven multiplied seven by seven results in the value 49 used to determine the 
effectiveness in the formula below. 1𝑛 ∗  𝑉! ∗ 𝑆!  →  149 ∗  𝑉! ∗ 𝑆!  
Table 32 represents the perceived effectiveness (LeVIS Index) for all items based on the 
SMEs responses. 
Table 25 
LeVIS Index Results for Perceived Effectiveness (N= 25) 
Item Satisfaction  Value  
LeVIS 
Index 
Variable 1: Workplace Satisfaction 4.99 5.75 0.59 
Variable 2: Change in Violation Patterns 4.42 6.00 0.54 
Variable 3: Audit Log Modification 4.91 5.89 0.59 
Variable 4: Changes in Data Access Patterns 4.92 6.43 0.65 
Variable 5: Data Exfiltration 5.11 6.48 0.68 
Variable 6: Privilege Change 5.37 6.15 0.67 
Complex Cyber Data Correlations 4.44 6.05 0.55 
Type of Variables Presented 4.46 5.58 0.51 
Interest in Variables Presented 4.41 5.70 0.51 
Organization of Variables Presented 4.32 5.55 0.49 
Complexity Based on Variables Presented 4.21 5.44 0.47 
Various Variables Were Well Integrated 4.18 5.37 0.46 
Relevance of Variables to Insider Threat 
Detection 4.51 6.31 0.58 
Quality of Visualizations 4.10 6.03 0.50 
Organization of Visualizations Presented 3.90 5.56 0.45 
Consistency of Visualizations Presented 4.41 6.03 0.57 
Ability to Quickly Decipher Potential Insider 
Threats 3.56 6.13 0.45 
Confidence Quickly Deciphering Potential 
Insider Threats 3.88 6.43 0.51 
Ability to Make Actionable Decisions Based 
on Information Depicted 3.83 6.23 0.49 
Ease of Use of Information Depicted 4.21 6.21 0.53 
Overall, how would you rate your level of 
satisfaction/importance of  QUICK.v™ when 
identifying potentially malicious cyber 
insiders? 
4.23 5.73 0.49 
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Figure 12: Satisfaction and Value Distribution Summary  
 
Figure 13: LeVIS Index Summary 
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 Additionally, the modified SUS statements were extracted for analysis. To 
provide an adjective rating that correlates with the acceptable SUS score of 70 or above. 
The extracted statements were not framed to alternate between positive and negative 
statements. Thus, a raw SUS score was calculated based solely on the extracted five SUS 
statements within survey instrument three. When statements alternate between the 
positive and negative, care must be taken when scoring the survey (Bangor et al., 2008). 
The SMEs satisfaction rating for each item was isolated for this analysis. The SUS score 
was calculated by creating a sum from the items rather than a mean score, this allows for 
analysis of the same variance as performed by Bangor et al. (2008). Table 26 represents 
the SUS score for the five items based on all SMEs responses. Table 27 represents the 
SUS quartile and its corresponding adjective rating based on all SMEs responses. 
 
Table 26 
SUS Scores (N=25) 
 
 
         
 
122
Table 27 
SUS Score by Quartile, Adjective Rating, and Acceptability (N=25) 
Participant 
Inflated Score 
(adjusted to a range 
of 0-100) SUS Quartile Adjective 
p1 54.3 1 Ok 
p2 85.7 4 Best Imaginable 
p3 22.9 1 Worst Imaginable 
p4 65.7 2 Good 
p5 80.0 4 Excellent 
p6 85.7 4 Best Imaginable 
p7 88.6 4 Best Imaginable 
p8 100.0 4 Best Imaginable 
p9 22.9 1 Worst Imaginable 
p10 65.7 2 Good 
p11 54.3 1 Good 
p12 60.0 1 Good 
p13 31.4 1 Poor 
p14 74.3 3 Excellent 
p15 74.3 3 Excellent 
p16 77.2 3 Excellent 
p17 82.9 4 Excellent 
p18 82.9 4 Excellent 
p19 54.3 1 Good 
p20 37.2 1 Poor 
p21 68.6 2 Good 
p22 82.9 4 Excellent 
p23 54.3 1 Good 
p24 82.9 4 Excellent 
p25 82.9 4 Excellent 
 
Phase Three - Comments 
 No exclusions were identified within the 25 completed surveys. In survey 
instrument three, SMEs were not asked for comments within the survey. Since the 
identified list of SMEs consisted of 300 individuals, the surveys were sent to all 300 
SMEs to complete on their own. With phase one and two consisting of Delphi survey 
instruments, by phase three there was an issue of non-response from many SMEs. It is 
common within Delphi investigations to be unable achieve and maintain an ideal 
response rate due to the characteristics of multiple iterations, the possible scarcity of 
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qualified subjects, and the relatively small number of subjects used (Hsu, & Sandford, 
2007, p. 1). As a result, only 25 completed surveys were received. From the 25 completed 
surveys the results indicated each of the identified individual critical cyber visualization 
variables were effective. 
 
Summary of the Results 
 In phase one, when SMEs were asked to select the relevant variable that were 
most important when identifying potentially malicious insider threats, the order in which 
the variable was selected corresponded to a weight. The weight was used to identify the 
most critical variable within the analytic variable category. For instance, changes in data 
access pattern was identified as the second most critical system analytic category variable 
though, the count equaled twelve. Unauthorized data access methods with the count equal 
to thirteen, had a significantly lower ranking. Since, the count was equal to seven for 
variable one which corresponded to changes in data access patterns. The count was equal 
to three for variable one, unauthorized data access methods. The higher weighting of a 
selection as variable one resulted in a higher weighted average ranking, consequently 
increasing the final ranking for changes in data access patterns. Subsequently, in phase 
one when SME’s were asked to select the relevant variable that is most important when 
trying to identify potentially malicious insider threats within each individual category the 
findings are as follows.  
 For the individual categories of system analytic variables, access inconsistent with 
user class was identified as the most critical variable within this category. In each 
individual category for facility analytic variables, time of access pattern changes was 
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identified as the most critical variable within this category.  Malware deployment was 
identified as most critical for the individual category of business capability. Unauthorized 
or inappropriate associations were identified as the critical visualization variable within 
the social analytic individual category. For the health individual category, mental 
instability was identified as a critical visualization variable. Complaints against the user 
were identified as a critical visualization variable within the human resources individual 
category. Observed change in means relative to peers was identified as a critical 
visualization variable for the financial individual category. Unauthorized or inappropriate 
use of tools was identified as the critical visualization variable for the security individual 
category. For the criminal analytic variable recent increase in criminal events was 
identified as the critical visualization variable. These finding vary from the identified 
rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables.  
 When SMEs were given the full list of cyber visualization variables and asked to 
consider only the top five variables important when identifying potentially malicious 
insider threats, alternate variables were identified as being most critical. Outside the 
context of an individual category, SMEs were able to truly focus on what was most 
critical to them based on their experience. From the ranking of variables a corresponding 
weight was applied to each variable. The weight was used to identify the top six most 
critical variables. The identified critical cyber visualization variables were: workplace 
satisfaction, change in violation patterns, audit log modification, changes in data access 
patterns, and privilege change.  
 In phase two, once the SMEs identified and validated the top six critical cyber 
visualization variables, a comprehensive review of literature was performed to identify 
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how each variable is visualized. From this review three visualization techniques were 
selected to be utilized as a visualization technique within phase two. A visual 
representation of the cyber visualization variable was then mocked up using each 
visualization technique. SMEs were then presented three images and asked to select the 
visualization technique most relevant to displaying data related to the critical cyber 
visualization variable. The results for each critical cyber visualization variable are as 
follows.  
 For workplace satisfaction, when presented with the options of a line graph, bar 
graph, and calendar style view, SMEs identified the line graph as the most valid 
visualization technique.  When presented with an area chart, radar plot, and streamgraph 
for change in violation pattern, SMEs identified the area chart as the most valid 
visualization technique. For audit log modification, when presented with a line graph, 
fisheye distortion, and bar graph, SMEs identified the line graph as the most valid 
visualization technique. For the critical cyber visualization variable, change in violation 
pattern when presented with a stacked column graph, a stacked bar graph, and a 
streamgraph, SMEs identified the stacked column graph as the most valid visualization 
technique. For data exfiltration, when presented with a line graph, column graph, and 
fisheye distortion, SMEs identified the line graph as the most valid visualization 
technique.  When presented with a line graph, stacked bars, and stacked columns for the 
critical cyber visualization variable, privilege change, SMEs identified the line graph as 
the most valid visualization technique.  
 To identify visualization techniques are most valid to present complex cyber data 
correlations, the SMEs were presented with three images showing the relationship 
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between two or more data variables. The visualization techniques used to present 
complex cyber data correlations were parallel coordinates, chord diagram, and 
hierarchical bundling. SMEs identified parallel coordinates as the most valid 
visualization technique. Since the visualization method identified only varied from the 
next option by one response, the focus group was sought for additional input. A parallel 
coordinate was identified as allowing for clear identification of scores. If an SME were in 
a critical situation and needed to make decisions quickly, a parallel coordinate would 
allow for faster identification of an issue versus a chord diagram. 
 In phase three, the perceived effectiveness for the top six critical cyber 
visualization variables was determined using the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid. 
Table 32 represents the overall effectiveness for all the validated items. Within the Value-
Satisfaction Dimension Grids (Figures 14-19) the mean satisfaction scores are on the 
horizontal axis while the mean value scores are on the vertical axis. The results of the 
Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid for workplace satisfaction (Figure 14) indicate that 
the SMEs perceived effectiveness dimensions are high-value-high-satisfaction. This 
implies that the critical cyber visualization variable, workplace satisfaction is of high 
importance to SMEs and the SMEs had high satisfaction with this variable. The results of 
the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid for change in violation patterns (Figure 15) 
indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness dimensions are high-value-high-
satisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber visualization variable, change in violation 
patterns is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had high satisfaction with this 
variable. The results of the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid for audit log 
modifications (Figure 16) indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness dimensions are 
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high-value-moderate-satisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber visualization 
variable, audit log modifications is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had 
moderate satisfaction with this variable.  
 The results of the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid for change in data access 
patterns (Figure 17) indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness dimensions are high-
value-moderate-satisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber visualization variable, 
change in data access patterns is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had 
moderate satisfaction with this variable. The results of the Value-Satisfaction Dimension 
Grid for data exfiltration (Figure 18) indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness 
dimensions are high-value-moderate-satisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber 
visualization variable, data exfiltration is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had 
moderate satisfaction with this variable. The results of the Value-Satisfaction Dimension 
Grid for privilege change (Figure 19) indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness 
dimensions are high-value-moderate-satisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber 
visualization variable, privilege change is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had 
moderate satisfaction with this variable. 
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Table 28 
LeVIS Index Results for Perceived Effectiveness Summary 
Item 
Perceived as 
Effective? 
Variable 1: Workplace Satisfaction Yes 
Variable 2: Change in Violation Patterns Yes 
Variable 3: Audit Log Modification Yes 
Variable 4: Changes in Data Access Patterns Yes 
Variable 5: Data Exfiltration Yes 
Variable 6: Privilege Change Yes 
Complex Cyber Data Correlations Yes 
Type of Variables Presented Yes 
Interest in Variables Presented Yes 
Organization of Variables Presented No 
Complexity Based on Variables Presented No 
Various Variables Were Well Integrated No 
Relevance of Variables to Insider Threat Detection Yes 
Quality of Visualizations Yes 
Organization of Visualizations Presented No 
Consistency of Visualizations Presented Yes 
Ability to Quickly Decipher Potential Insider Threats No 
Confidence quickly Deciphering Potential Insider Threats Yes 
Ability to Make Actionable Decisions Based on Information 
Depicted No 
Ease of Use of Information Depicted Yes 
Overall, how would you rate your level of satisfaction/value of  
QUICK.v™ when identifying potentially malicious cyber 
insiders? No 
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Figure 14: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid 
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 1: Workplace 
Satisfaction 
 
 
Figure 15: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid 
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 2: Change in Violation 
Patterns 
         
 
130
 
 
 
Figure 16: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid 
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 3: Audit Log 
Modification 
 
 
Figure 17: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid 
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 4: Change in Data 
Access Patterns 
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Figure 18: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid 
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 5: Data Exfiltration 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid 
   Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 6: Privilege Change 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
Conclusions 
 Financial and intellectual property damages continue to rise as a result of insider 
threats (Cole, 2015; Gorg et al., 2013; Inibhunu et al., 2016; Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009). 
This study attempted to address the prevalent challenge within the cybersecurity industry 
when detecting potentially malicious insider cyber threats and enabling the visualization 
of threats as they occur. This process was conducted by developing a cyber visualization 
prototype using SME validated critical cyber visualization variables and techniques. This 
study achieved the five goals using a three-phased approach. First, using the Dephi 
method SMEs identified and ranked the critical cyber visualization variables that should 
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider cyber threats. 
Next, using the Delphi method SMEs identified visualization techniques that are most 
valid to present complex cyber data correlations and the top six critical cyber 
visualization variables. Finally, SMEs identified the perceived effectiveness of the 
developed prototype QUICK.v™.  
 
Discussion 
 Overall, the results of the study designated the top six critical cyber visualization 
variables: workplace satisfaction, change in violation patterns, audit log modification, 
changes in data access patterns, data exfiltration, and privilege change. These results 
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suggest that cybersecurity analysts should initially focus on anomalies within these areas 
when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider cyber threats. The results 
also indicated most valid visualization technique to present complex cyber data 
correlations are parallel coordinates. The most valid visualization technique to present the 
top six critical cyber visualization variables are: line graph, area chart, line graph, stacked 
column graph, line graph, and line graph (denoted in the order that each variable was 
previously listed). The results also identified parallel coordinates as the most valid to 
present complex cyber data correlations relevant to the pre-designated critical cyber 
visualization variables. This suggests that cybersecurity analysts should be presented 
simplified visualizations using these visualization techniques when presenting the critical 
cyber visualization variables.  
 Overall, QUICK.v™ was not implied to be effective based on the SMEs’ overall 
perceived effectiveness rating (i.e. satisfaction & value/importance) when mitigating 
potentially malicious cyber insider threats. However, each of the identified individual 
critical cyber visualization variables was found to be effective. Perceived effectiveness 
was also implied for the following items: complex cyber data correlations, the types of 
variables presented, interest in the variables presented, relevance of the variables to 
insider threat detection, quality of visualizations, consistency of visualizations presented, 
confidence quickly deciphering potential insider threats, and ease of use of information 
depicted. Perceived effectiveness was not implied for the following items: organization of 
variables presented, complexity based on variables presented, various variables were well 
integrated, organization of visualizations presented, ability to quickly decipher potential 
         
 
134
insider threats, ability to make actionable decisions based on information depicted, and 
the overall value and satisfaction of QUICK.v™.  
 From the five items analyzed to determine the SUS scores, thirteen of the 25 
participants had an SUS score above 70, which is deemed as acceptable. The sample 
average SUS score was 66.9%. Thus the overall perceived usability or user satisfaction of 
QUICK.v™ based on the five modified SUS statements fell within quartile two which is 
deemed as satisfied based on the SUS Score by quartile, adjective rating, and 
acceptability (Bangor et al., 2008).  
 
Implications 
 There are implications of this study in relation to the existing body of knowledge 
in IS and InfoSec. This study developed a novel and effective detection method for the 
identification of anomalous activities when mitigating malicious insider cyber threats. 
Many cybersecurity tools presenting visualizations are rarely evaluated for effectiveness 
nor do they account for the needs of the user (Sethi et al., 2016). This study identified 
SME validated cybersecurity vital signs, their corresponding visualization technique, and 
validated the effectiveness. Since financial and intellectual property loses continue to rise 
due to insider threats, it is important to ensure cybersecurity analysts are enabled to 
mitigate potentially malicious cyber insider threats. 
 In this study, the SME data collection occurred over a span of fifteen weeks. This 
time period allowed for SME participation and follow-up. Using an expert panel required 
continual follow-up, which resulted in delays. Though follow-ups were found to be a 
method for reducing non-response within the Delphi process, a drawback to Delphi 
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process is that the questionnaire method may slow data collection (Chang et al., 2018).
 This study provides companies with cybersecurity vital signs that are perceived as 
effective when identifying potentially malicious cyber insiders. These cybersecurity vital 
signs could assist with the identification and mitigation of malicious insiders cyber 
threats.  
 
Recommendations and Future Research  
 Generally, when asked to determine criticality while restricted within one 
category, SMEs identified with variables that they knew they could most likely measure 
or determine based on data. Thus, workplace satisfaction, a variable identified as most 
critical fell to a lowered ranking within the individual category as most SMEs 
acknowledged this as data they would not be able to obtain. The SMEs then selected a 
choice that logically seemed more attainable to them like unauthorized or inappropriate 
associations. Since this data may be possibly obtained from an employees social media 
connections. Workplace satisfaction though critical was ranked lower since the data 
seemed unattainable. In giving the SMEs all 45 variables to parse and select only five, 
they subjectively chose what seemed most pertinent without over analysis. Future studies 
would increase the validity of the identified critical cyber visualization variables.  
 When asked to identify valid visualization techniques though SMEs were drawn 
to the more unique visualization options, they opted to select the more simple 
visualization techniques. These visualization techniques were identified with being more 
familiar to the SMEs. It can be denoted that the identification with more simplified 
visualization techniques, in the form of lines and charts, reflects similarities to the type of 
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visualizations standardized on EKGs. Like medical professionals cybersecurity 
professionals may prefer simplified visualizations. It may be assumed that simplified 
visualizations may reduce cognitive load during times of crisis. However, this assumption 
may be further investigated within future research. 
 
Summary 
 This study addressed the prevalent challenge faced within the cybersecurity 
industry when detecting potentially malicious insider cyber threats, to enable 
visualization of those threats as they occur (Gorg et al., 2013; Inibhunu et al., 2016; 
Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009; Patcha & Park, 2007). Insider threat, threatens personal data, 
national security, as well as economic prosperity (Pfleeger et al., 2010). In cybersecurity 
mitigating adverse incidents require surveillance to identify anomaly metrics and attack 
patterns (Agrafiotis et al., 2015). Delays in identifying a potentially malicious cyber 
insider may result in substantial losses, resulting in the deterioration of an organization 
(Randazzo et al., 2005).  
Detecting malicious cybersecurity insiders is a complex task since their malicious 
actions take place alongside normal behavior (Azaria, Richardson, Kraus, & 
Subrahmanian, 2014). Detecting misuse by malicious cybersecurity insiders involves 
examining an individual’s use of information and resources to determine whether the use 
is appropriate (Caputo, Maloof, & Stephens, 2009). Identifying malicious behaviors 
amidst appropriate activities pose an issue. Cybersecurity analysts must identify outliers 
or anomalies within a users activities utilizing information visualization (Kang & Gorg, 
2011). Therefore, identifying anomalies and taking corrective action pose a challenge 
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(Azaria et al., 2014).  
 The main goal of this research was to validate empirically a dashboard 
visualization prototype for cross team collaboration and proactive responses when 
reacting to malicious cybersecurity insiders. Building on the works of Albanese, Pugliese, 
and Subrahmanian (2013), Boukri and Chaoui (2015), Greitzer and Hohimer (2011), 
Legg et al. (2015), as well as Legg, Moffat, Nurse, and Happa (2013). Albanese et al. 
(2013) developed a graphical index that would aid in providing evidence of occurrences 
of an activity, and identify if a problem matches a sequence of observations. Though the 
threat posed by malicious cybersecurity insiders is very real, there is a lack of actual 
analysis of activity logs due to the sheer volume of activities being conducted daily (Legg 
et al., 2015). 
This study had five specific goals. The first research goal was to identify the 
critical cyber visualization variables. The second research goal was to identify the rank 
order of the critical cyber visualization variables that the developed prototype should 
include, which may aid in identifying potentially malicious cyber insiders. The third 
research goal was to identify the most valid presentation of complex data correlations 
using the identified critical visualization variables over multiple visualization techniques. 
The fourth research goal was to apply SMEs’ identified critical visualization variables, in 
rank order, and techniques to develop QUICK.v™. The fifth research goal was to 
conduct an experimental study to assess the perceived effectiveness using self-reported 
value and satisfaction of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating malicious cyber 
insiders.  
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 In phase one, an exploratory study was conducted. Cybersecurity SMEs were 
solicited from the researches LinkedIn professional contacts to answer the following 
research questions:  
RQ1: What are SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that should 
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider 
cyber threats?   
RQ2:  What is the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization 
variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat 
dashboard visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber 
insider activities? 
 The Delphi method was used in order to obtain consensus among SMEs on the 
identified critical cyber visualization variables and their corresponding rank order. The 
result of the survey was the identified top six critical cyber visualization variables. 
 Once the SMEs identified and validated the top six critical cyber visualization 
variables, a comprehensive review of literature was performed to identify how each 
variable is visually represented. In phase two, data collection was performed with 
cybersecurity and visualization SMEs. The SMEs consisted of cybersecurity and 
visualization professionals. These individuals were sourced from the researchers 
LinkedIn network. In phase two, SMEs were then presented three images and asked to 
select the visualization technique most relevant to displaying data related to the critical 
cyber visualization variable, in order to answer the following research questions:  
RQ3: What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present 
complex cyber data correlations relevant to the pre-designated critical 
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cyber visualization variables that are applied within the developed cyber 
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?   
RQ4: What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present 
top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially malicious 
cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber 
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?  
 In phase three, qualitative and quantitative data was collected from cybersecurity 
and visualization professionals. SMEs were asked to view the developed prototype and 
identify level of satisfaction and importance in order to answer the following research 
question: 
RQ5: What is the SMEs’ perceived effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction & 
value/importance) of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating potentially 
malicious cyber insider threats? 
This study made several contributions to Information Systems and Information 
Security body of knowledge by developing a novel and effective detection method for the 
identification of anomalous activities when mitigating malicious insider cyber threats. 
The study provided empirical evidence regarding the magnitude of endless alerts, 
increasing the time required for decision-making when identifying potentially malicious 
insiders cyber threats. Given the significant financial and intellectual property damage 
posed to organizations, the results of this study provides organizations with empirical 
evidence of how to visualize cybersecurity vital signs pertinent to the identification of 
malicious cyber insiders. Lack of identification and mitigation of potentially malicious 
cyber insider threats could result in substantial financial losses for an organization, or 
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government entity. 
In conclusion, organizations can use the identified cybersecurity vital signs and 
the validated visualization techniques to aid in the identification of malicious insiders. 
QUICK.v™ addressed the challenge of detecting cyber insider threats in an 
unconventional way by enhancing the presentation of complex malicious insider cyber 
threat correlations. In addition, QUICK.v™ can be used as a guide for alleviating the 
issues faced when using visualizations to identify potentially malicious insiders cyber 
threats. 
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Appendix A 
Qualitative Survey Instrument 1(TEMPLATE):  Instrument for SMEs 
Identification of Cyber Visualization Variables 
Please read the following instructions and definitions before completing this survey 
The purpose of this survey is to identify cyber visualization variables (analytic variable or 
outputs that may indicate an insider threat and prompts for further analysis) that a cyber 
specific information visualization should include that may aid in identifying potentially 
malicious insiders cyber threats.  
Please respond to all questions as honestly and accurately as possible. By completing this 
survey you agree and understand that your responses are voluntary. Measures were taken 
to ensure that responses are anonymous and cannot be traced to any individual. You may 
exit this survey at any time. In the event that you chose to exit this survey, your responses 
will not be recorded. By participating in this survey you certify that you are over the age 
of 18 years old. 
 
Cyberspace or ‘Cyber’ – Independent network of IT infrastructures that includes the 
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
 controllers in critical industries (White House, 2009).   
 
Cybersecurity – Prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if 
 needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems to ensure 
 confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Axelrod, 2006).   
 
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and 
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014). 
 
Insider Threat - Individuals with legitimate access whose behaviors put a firm’s data, 
intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at risk of being attacked 
(Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010). 
 
Intrusion Detection System - Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes 
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible 
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse (NIST, 2013).  
 
Malicious Insider - Is an insider who has malicious intent that acts against the best 
interests of the organization (Santos et al., 2012). 
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Section A  
Initial Cyber Visualization Variables 
  
From the cyber visualization variables presented below, place an x next to the variables 
that a most important to you when trying to identify potentially malicious insider threats. 
(Example: Based on the sample list below – ‘System authentication and authorization failures’) 
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1. List any additional cyber visualization variables you think will support the 
identification of potentially malicious insiders cyber threats, that are not listed 
above. 
(Example: Based on the sample list above – ‘System authentication and 
authorization failures’) 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________  
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2. From all the variables identified above, please think of issues related to insider 
threat detection and list only the top 5 variables important to you when 
identifying potentially malicious insider threats.  
1. _____________________________________________________ 
2. _____________________________________________________ 
3. _____________________________________________________ 
4. _____________________________________________________ 
5. _____________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. From the 5 variables identified in Question 2, please think of issues related to 
insider threat detection and rank the variables from most important to least 
important    (1 – least important and 5- most important).  
1. _____________________________________________________ 
2. _____________________________________________________ 
3. _____________________________________________________ 
4. _____________________________________________________ 
5. _____________________________________________________ 
 
4. What are the positives of using the 5 variables identified in Question 2 when 
identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber threats? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Are there any negatives associated with using the 5 variables identified in 
Question 2 when identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber threats? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
Section B 
Demographic Information 
 
What is your job function? 
 
(A) Administrative staff 
(B) Cybersecurity/IT staff 
(C) Engineer 
(D) Manager 
(E) Operations 
(F) Professional staff 
(G) Security operator 
(H) Technical staff 
(I) Other __________________ 
 
How long have you been with your current organization? 
 
(A) Under 1 year 
(B) 1 – 5 years 
(C) 6 – 10 years 
(D) 11 – 15 years 
(E) 16 – 20 years 
(F) 21 – 25 years 
(G) 26 – 30 years 
(H) Over 30 years 
 
Which describes your current employer? 
 
(A) Academia 
(B) Federal government employee 
(C) Private sector company 
(D) State government employee 
(E) Other __________________ 
 
What is your highest level of education? 
 
(A) High school diploma 
(B) 2-year college (Associates degree)  
(C) 4-year college (Bachelors degree) 
(D) Graduate degree 
(E) Doctorate 
(F) Other 
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Do you currently hold any cybersecurity certifications, if so how many do you possess? 
 
(A) 0 
(B) 1 
(C) 2 
(D) 3 
(E) 4 
(F) 5 or more 
 
What is your age?  
 
(A) Under 20 
(B) 20-29 
(C) 30-39 
(D) 40-49 
(E) 50-59 
(F) Over 60 
 
What is your gender? 
 
(A) Female 
(B) Male 
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Appendix B 
Qualitative Survey Instrument 2 (TEMPLATE): Instrument for SME 
Identification of Visualization Technique for Cyber Variables 
Please read the following definitions before completing this survey 
 
This Appendix is only a template since the top six critical cyber visualization variables 
will not be finalized until the completion of Appendix A. Thus, allowing for the 
identification of the most valid visualization techniques to present the top six critical 
cyber visualization variables, therefore, this Appendix is only for illustration purposes.  
The purpose of this survey is to identify the visualization techniques best suited to present 
the cyber visualization variables previously identified by SMEs that may aid in 
identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber threats. 
Cyberspace or ‘Cyber’ – Independent network of IT infrastructures that includes the 
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
 controllers in critical industries (White House, 2009).   
 
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and 
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014). 
 
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and 
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014). 
 
Insider Threat - Individuals with legitimate access whose behaviors put a firm’s data, 
intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at risk of being attacked 
(Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010). 
 
Intrusion Detection System - Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes 
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible 
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse (NIST, 2013).  
 
Malicious Insider - Is an insider who has malicious intent that acts against the best 
interests of the organization (Santos et al., 2012). 
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Section A  
1. Please review the visualization technique used to present each of the variables 
depicted below and select your preferred presentation technique for each 
variable.  
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Section B 
Demographic Information 
 
What is your job function? 
 
(A) Administrative staff 
(B) Cybersecurity/IT staff 
(C) Engineer 
(D) Manager 
(E) Operations 
(F) Professional staff 
(G) Security operator 
(H) Technical staff 
(I) Other __________________ 
 
How long have you been with your current organization? 
 
(A) Under 1 year 
(B) 1 – 5 years 
(C) 6 – 10 years 
(D) 11 – 15 years 
(E) 16 – 20 years 
(F) 21 – 25 years 
(G) 26 – 30 years 
(H) Over 30 years 
 
Which describes your current employer? 
 
(A) Academia 
(B) Federal government employee 
(C) Private sector company 
(D) State government employee 
(E) Other __________________ 
 
What is your highest level of education? 
 
(A) High school diploma 
(B) 2-year college (Associates degree)  
(C) 4-year college (Bachelors degree) 
(D) Graduate degree 
(E) Doctorate 
(F) Other 
 
Do you currently hold any cybersecurity certifications, if so how many do you possess? 
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(A) 0 
(B) 1 
(C) 2 
(D) 3 
(E) 4 
(F) 5 or more 
 
What is your age?  
 
(A) Under 20 
(B) 20-29 
(C) 30-39 
(D) 40-49 
(E) 50-59 
(F) Over 60 
 
What is your gender? 
 
(A) Female 
(B) Male 
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Appendix C 
Quantitative Survey Instrument 3 (TEMPLATE): Instrument for 
Cybersecurity Analysts’ Perceived Effectiveness of the Prototype 
Please read the following definitions before completing this survey 
The purpose of this survey is to determine the perceived effectiveness of the cyber 
visualization variables presented and the visualization techniques used was identified. 
The instrument depicted below is a draft for the final version that was developed based 
on SME input. Keep the definitions below in mind as you complete the survey.  
 
Cyberspace or ‘Cyber’ – Independent network of IT infrastructures that includes the 
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
 controllers in critical industries (White House, 2009).   
 
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and 
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014). 
 
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and 
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014). 
 
Insider Threat - Individuals with legitimate access whose behaviors put a firm’s data, 
intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at risk of being attacked 
(Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010). 
 
Intrusion Detection System - Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes 
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible 
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse (NIST, 2013).  
 
Malicious Insider - Is an insider who has malicious intent that acts against the best 
interests of the organization (Santos et al., 2012). 
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Section A  
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Section B 
Demographic Information 
 
What is your job function? 
 
(A) Administrative staff 
(B) Cybersecurity/IT staff 
(C) Engineer 
(D) Manager 
(E) Operations 
(F) Professional staff 
(G) Security operator 
(H) Technical staff 
(I) Other __________________ 
 
How long have you been with your current organization? 
 
(A) Under 1 year 
(B) 1 – 5 years 
(C) 6 – 10 years 
(D) 11 – 15 years 
(E) 16 – 20 years 
(F) 21 – 25 years 
(G) 26 – 30 years 
(H) Over 30 years 
 
Which describes your current employer? 
 
(A) Academia 
(B) Federal government employee 
(C) Private sector company 
(D) State government employee 
(E) Other __________________ 
 
What is your highest level of education? 
 
(A) High school diploma 
(B) 2-year college (Associates degree)  
(C) 4-year college (Bachelors degree) 
(D) Graduate degree 
(E) Doctorate 
(F) Other 
 
Do you currently hold any cybersecurity certifications, if so how many do you possess? 
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(A) 0 
(B) 1 
(C) 2 
(D) 3 
(E) 4 
(F) 5 or more 
 
What is your age?  
 
(A) Under 20 
(B) 20-29 
(C) 30-39 
(D) 40-49 
(E) 50-59 
(F) Over 60 
 
What is your gender? 
 
(A) Female 
(B) Male 
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Appendix D 
Qualitative Survey Instrument 1 (FINAL): Email to SMEs 
 
 
 
         
 
160
 
 
Appendix E 
Qualitative Survey Instrument 1 (FINAL): Instrument for SMEs 
Identification of Cyber Visualization Variables 
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Appendix F 
Qualitative Survey Instrument 2 (FINAL): Email to SMEs 
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Appendix G 
Qualitative Survey Instrument 2 (FINAL): Instrument for SME 
Identification of Visualization Technique for Cyber Variables 
 
         
 
167
 
         
 
168
 
         
 
169
 
         
 
170
 
         
 
171
         
 
172
 
 
         
 
173
 
         
 
174
 
         
 
175
         
 
176
 
         
 
177
 
         
 
178
 
         
 
179
 
         
 
180
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
181
 
 
Appendix H 
Qualitative Survey Instrument 3 (FINAL): Email to SMEs 
 
         
 
182
 
 
Appendix I 
Quantitative Survey Instrument 3 (FINAL): Instrument for Cybersecurity 
Analysts’ Perceived Effectiveness of the Prototype 
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Appendix J 
Developed Prototype QUICK.v™ (FINAL) 
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